EMU Government Bond Yield Spreads and Determinants of Risk Premia -the Sovereign Debt Crisis: PIIGS in EU by Nordberg, C. Markus
  
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
FACULTY OF BUSINESS STUDIES 
DEPARTMENT OF ACCOUNTING AND FINANCE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Markus Nordberg 
 
EMU GOVERNMENT BOND YIELD SPREADS  
AND DETERMINANTS OF RISK PREMIA 
– the Sovereign Debt Crisis: PIIGS in EU 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master’s Thesis in 
Accounting and Finance 
 
Finance 
 
 
VAASA 2011 
1 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS        page 
 
ABSTRACT 9 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 11 
1.1. Purpose of the study 16 
1.2. Structure of the study 18 
 
2. BOND MARKET AND EMU 20 
2.1. Bond characteristics 20 
2.2. Bond valuation and term structure of interest rates 21 
2.2.1 Theories of the term structure 23 
2.3. Risk premiums 27 
2.4. EMU context 30 
2.5. The sovereign debt crisis in the EU 32 
 
3. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 36 
3.1. Seminal bond research 36 
3.2. Government bond and integration research 37 
3.3. Government bond yields integration in EMU research 46 
3.4. Summary of the previous studies 51 
 
4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 52 
4.1. The data of the thesis 52 
4.2. Yield spreads 53 
4.3. Determinants of risk premia 57 
4.3.1. Solvency 57 
4.3.2. International risk 59 
4.3.3. Liquidity 61 
2 
 
3 
 
4.4. Results 66 
 
5. EVIDENCE AT THE COUNTRY-LEVEL 68 
5.1. Data 68 
5.2. Econometric methodology 69 
5.2.1. The regression model 71 
5.3. Econometric evidence at the country-level from quarter data 74 
5.4. Econometric evidence at the country-level from monthly data 76 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 80 
 
REFERENCES 81 
 
4 
 
5 
 
FIGURES             page 
 
Figure 1. Government bond yields in the euro area. 12 
Figure 2. Interest rate spreads for EU15 (in basis points)    
between May 1990 and May 2009. 13 
Figure 3. Short rates versus spot rates. 23 
Figure 4. The yield curves of U.S. Treasuries and U.K. Gilts. 26 
Figure 5. The inverse relationship between bond prices and yields. 27 
Figure 6. 2010 GDP at market prices of 17 euro countries, in billion euros. 53 
Figure 7. (a-j) Daily yield differentials in the euro area 
during 2007−2010, in basis points. 54 
Figure 8. The yields of 10-yr EMU government bonds 
in 2007−2010 as quarter average. 56 
Figure 9. General government gross debt as percentage of government’s  
GDP according to the convergence criteria set out in the 
Maastricht Treaty. 58 
Figure 10. The moving averages of EMU government debt ratios. 58 
Figure 11. The yield of US T-note, yields of eurozone bonds and the 
Eurostoxx50 price index, from Jan 2006 to Mar 2011. 61 
Figure 12. (a – k) The differences in trading volumes between the two 
liquidity data set. 63 
Figure 13. The classical assumptions of OLS method 
and qualifications for BLUE. 73 
 
6 
 
7 
 
TABLES             page 
 
Table 1. The average prices of EMU governments’ 10-yr zero-coupon 
bonds together with consolidated government gross debts as 
the percentage of Gross Domestic Product. 15 
Table 2. The Maastricht Criteria. 32 
Table 3. Synopsis of the main points of the previous studies. 51 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of yield spreads. 55 
Table 5. The public deficit figures of selected countries in percentages of GDP.59 
Table 6. The liquidity stats. 65 
Table 6. The causal relationships of variables with YSi. 71 
Table 7. Summary of country-level results from the regressions with 
quarter data. 74 
Table 8. Summary of country-level results from the regressions with 
monthly data. 77 
 
8 
 
9 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
Faculty of Business Studies 
Author:     Markus Nordberg 
Topic of the Thesis:   EMU government bond yield spreads and  
      determinants of risk premia −the Sovereign
      Debt Crisis: PIIGS in EU 
Name of the Supervisor:  Timo Rothovius 
Degree: Masters of Science in Economics and  
Business 
Department:    Department of Accounting and Finance 
Major Subject:    Accounting and Finance 
Line:      Finance 
Year of Entering the University: 2005 
Year of Completing the University: 2011                 Pages: 84 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Globalization and attributed financial markets integration are central themes 
and topics in today’s international finance. Since the start of 1999 when the euro 
was introduced, the integration started to accelerate among European financial 
markets and especially on the European government bond markets. This is also 
widely acknowledged in the topic’s previous literature. However things started 
to turn upside down since the beginning of the turmoil in financial markets 
caused by the US’s subprime mortgage crisis. The spreads between the EMU 
government bond yields begun to widen and in late 2009 the solvency of some 
member states became questionable. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to study how large have the EMU government bond 
yield spreads become during 2010. Moreover how well the country-specific 
EMU convergence criteria, international risk and liquidity premium explain 
these spreads. 
 
In line with the previous literature the evidence suggests the wider spreads are 
caused by the credit quality factors driven by the current market situation. Thus 
despite the earlier integration some risk premiums have grown unbearable 
while the EMU government bonds have became relatively strong substitutes. 
 
KEYWORDS: EMU government bond yield spreads, 2010 solvency crisis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalization and attributed financial markets integration are central themes 
and topics in today’s international finance. Interest on these themes grows on 
because of their benefits and other byproducts. The benefits of integration like 
economic growth via risk sharing, improved capital allocation and reductions 
in macroeconomic volatility and transaction costs are all well accepted matters 
(Kim, Moshirian & Wu 2005). These phenomena and most of the benefits are 
easily seen in Europe in a smaller scale under the influence of the European 
Economic and Monetary Union, EMU (see e.g. Baele, Ferrando, Hördahl, 
Krylova & Monnet 2004).  
 
Same benefits were also behind the targets of the Delors report in 1989 named 
only then as less volatile economic growth, lower inflation and more efficient 
capital markets together with higher employment. The report was the first plan 
to implement EMU in three stages. Starting from complete liberalisation of 
capital movements in the European Economic Community (EEC, later became 
EC) and convergence criteria (The Treaty of Maastricht) via establishing the 
European Central Bank (ECB) finally leading to the single currency, euro. (Rossi 
2001: 4). 
 
Since the start of 1999 when the euro was introduced, the integration started to 
accelerate among European financial markets. The velocity of integration varied 
between different market sectors and some sectors obtained higher degree of 
integration much faster than others (Baele et al. 2004: 80). Those included 
government bond markets as can be seen on the following page in Figure 1. 
Since then the effects of EMU have motivated many researchers and a lot of 
evidence can be found related to integration and development of European 
government bond markets. 
 
In the core of European government bond markets research has traditionally 
been German 10-yr government bond called ‚Bund‛. It has retained its place as 
the benchmark bond for two reasons, relative liquidity and credit quality. Both 
factors simply arise from the German government’s economical status and 
history of having the most traded securities on European markets. Germany 
being solvent and the largest economy in Europe, its government bonds are the 
most liquid among euro nominated bonds. As a result based on the previous 
12 
 
facts and the financial theory of market efficiency in other words can be stated 
that the bund is the most correctly priced due to its liquidity and the most 
riskless security due to the solvency and low yield, when compared to other 
European bonds. (Ejsing & Sihvonen 2009: 14−15.) 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Government bond yields in the euro area (Codogno, Favero & Missale 2003: 507). 
 
 
In many studies on euro area government bonds (e.g. Codogno et al. 2003, Baele 
et al. 2004, Pagano & von Thadden 2004, Kim et al. 2005) the findings have been 
similar in a sense that every euro-country’s bond yield spreads with German 
bund have narrowed, even with quite a pace, after the introduction of euro. 
This is partly because the European intra-market of government bonds has lost 
the currency risk component. It is logical in terms of mutual inflation and 
expectations of the euro area carrying a lower risk together than its participants 
on their own. Considering sovereign bonds outside the euro area similar effect 
should be seen because no doubt the euro is a much more stable currency than 
national currencies of the participants and so the currency carries a lower risk 
when the exchange rate is less volatile. Although in sovereign bond context 
outside the euro area, inflation plays a more significant role than before. 
However, inside EMU the same financial instrument’s risks can be assumed to 
reduce when issuing government changes to mutual currency. This explains 
some of the integration in euro area government bond markets. 
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The narrower spreads are not though necessarily resulting only from the 
elimination of currency risk. If the liquidity factor is considered to be remained 
more or less the same as well as the national aspects (e.g. tax treatments), the 
remaining part and perhaps the most significant part of the risk factor would be 
credit risk component. In this case the bond yields movement towards the bond 
yield of German bund suggests the mutual currency has also lowered the credit 
risk of other participant countries ceteris paribus. This gives an indication that 
on the markets EMU is thought to be more solvent than its participants on their 
own or that EMU is willing to sustain its in debt members no matter what the 
cost. Indication derives from the assumption that solvency and credit risk are 
positively correlated. And because of Germany’s solvency and economic power, 
the other participants of EMU benefit most from joining the euro in terms of 
interest rates of government debt. This explains why the integration has moved 
toward the German bund yield. 
 
The integration in EMU government yield spreads harmonized even more 
through the 2000s, when spreads larger than 1 % were quite rare. This is 
demonstrated in Figure 2. below which depicts interest rate spreads between all 
euro country bonds and benchmark bonds (i.e. German bund and U.S. bond in 
case where bund data n/a), spread measured at the time of issuance of the bond 
(Schuknecht, von Hagen & Wolswijk 2009: 1). 
 
 
Figure 2. Interest rate spreads for EU15 (in basis points) between May 1990 and May 2009 
(Schuknecht et al. 2009: 1). 
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Yet things have turned upside down starting slowly from the beginning of the 
subprime mortgage crisis of U.S. in 2007 (Berg 2010: 17). As the crisis started to 
accelerate in the U.S. and latest when the Lehmann brothers collapsed in 
September 2008, the credit risk awareness spread to European capital markets. 
In the Figure 2. this is easily seen as the jump of the large mass over the 100 
basis points line. Continuation of this financial crisis finally cumulated to fears 
of a sovereign debt crisis in Europe. 
 
In late 2009 the fears became true when the solvency of some members of the 
EU became questionable. Implications from this were ongoing widening in the 
bond yield spreads, downgrades of government credit ratings and weaker 
economic forecasts for the most in debt countries. This ongoing sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe concerns most notably Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and 
Spain (the PIIGS). 
 
The first country with widening spread was Greece after it confessed a 
somewhat creative accounting in its government’s accountancy. When the 
markets perceived other in debt countries, the spreads of Ireland and Portugal 
followed Greece’s example. Lots of speculation swirled also around Spain and 
Italy and still continue. During the financial crisis these speculations have 
appeared in mass media as well whether this recession will develop to be the 
worst in the world history since the Great Depression. Therefore it is interesting 
to see if the determinants of risk premiums have remained stable within the 
whole crisis as them did during the Great Depression, according to Fisher 
(1959) who studied the topic with corporation bonds. 
 
According to the very basic theory of finance, the risk-return trade-off with the 
effective market hypothesis, one should remember that if there is return there is 
risk as well. Consequently, and especially in the light of past events one should 
also bear in mind that even government bonds, often called risk-free or riskless 
assets, cannot be automatically taken as free from the credit risk even with 
developed countries. The case of default (i.e. the borrower’s failure to pay the timely 
debt and/or interest payments) should be seen as the ultimate risk in all 
government debts as well, even though the history provides us few straight 
examples from this. One significant issue related to this in EMU context is that 
the member states have lost their ability to print money. Therefore the default 
probability of a participant in EMU actually may have risen along with joining 
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the monetary union. This is because of the in debt governments do not have 
anymore monetary tools to affect the relative size of the debt as they did before 
and because EMU countries were not obliged to bail out each others according 
to the Lisbon treaty. (Codogno et al. 2003: 509.) 
 
However, since a default results from lost solvency, it should be a good idea to 
always introduce the market yields or prices of government bonds together 
with, at least one measurement referring to the credit risk, e.g. such as 
government debt ratios or budget deficit/surplus. The idea behind this is the 
simple risk-return trade-off where the creditor should be interested in the 
financial standing of the borrower since this is one of the key matters whilst 
defining the correct interest rate. For realization of this, a straight example is 
given below in Table 1. where are illustrated the average prices of 10-year zero-
coupon bonds of EMU countries with debt-to-GDP ratios at the end of the years 
2009 and 2010 together with their relative change. 
 
 
Table 1. The average prices of EMU governments’ 10-yr zero-coupon bonds with par value 
1 000 euro in December 2009 and 2010, together with consolidated government gross debts as 
the percentage of Gross Domestic Product (Maastricht criteria) at the end of the years 2009 and 
2010. The grey columns indicate yearly change in prices and ratios. (ECB and Eurostat, 2011.) 
Country 
12/2009 
avg. price 
(€) 
12/2010 
avg. price 
(€) 
1-yr  
price 
change 
12/2009 
Debt-to-
GDP (%) 
12/2009 
Debt-to-
GDP (%) 
1-yr 
change 
in dtG 
Germany 734.06 750.63 (2.3 %) 73.5 83.2 (13.2 %) 
Netherlands 713.04 732.63 (2.7 %) 60.8 62.7 (3.1 %) 
Finland 711.66 730.51 (2.6 %) 43.8 48.4 (10.5 %) 
France 710.29 719.97 (1.4 %) 78.3 81.7 (4.3 %) 
Austria 701.43 713.73 (1.8 %) 69.6 72.3 (3.9 %) 
Belgium 701.43 676.21 (-3.6 %) 96.2 96.8 (0.6 %) 
Spain 688.03 592.13 (-13.9 %) 53.3 60.1 (12.8 %) 
Portugal 681.44 531.23 (-22.0 %) 83.3 93.0 (12.0 %) 
Italy 674.91 637.80 (-5.5 %) 116.1 119.0 (2.5 %) 
Ireland 620.97 444.33 (-28.4 %) 65.6 96.2 (46.6 %) 
Greece 585.99 321.69 (-45.1 %) 127.1 142.8 (12.4 %) 
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1.1. Purpose of the study 
 
The aim of this thesis is to study how large have the EMU government bond 
yield spreads become during 2010. Moreover how well the EMU convergence 
criteria among other credit quality factors explain these spreads. Therefore the 
study is to show how influential country-specific features can eventually grow 
during a crisis time, even in properly integrated common market area such as 
EMU is. The influence is measured with the risk premiums observed in market 
yields. The thesis aims in determination of the risk premium to find support on 
the assumption that the country-specific features are indeed behind the 
observed changes in the premiums and thus to question market pricing. The 
assumption is made in terms of the structure of EMU and efficiently 
functioning EMU government bond markets expectation. The study is 
motivated by the recent news and market movements which suggest that even 
the bonds of western developed governments are exposed to default risk 
nowadays. This aspect is exceedingly interesting in a context where these 
government bonds are, at least once were, generally considered as risk-free or 
riskless and therefore may have been led to market mispricing. 
 
The study concentrates on the yield spreads between EMU government bonds 
and the German bund just before and during the latter financial crisis in 
Europe. These spreads are understood as the risk premiums since the bund is 
concerned the less risky asset in Europe. Moreover the study tries to figure out 
how much of the risk premium could be explained by solvency, liquidity and 
international risk since the market movements after 2009 might indicate 
mispricing in government bond prices of the PIIGS countries. 
 
First the risk premiums are analyzed so that the development, variation and 
level of integration during the financial crisis can be observed. Target of this 
analysis is to define how the euro area government bonds’ yields are related to 
each other 10 years after the introduction of euro. According to previous studies 
related to the subject (e.g. Codogno et al. 2003, Baele et al. 2004, Pagano & von 
Thadden 2004) the risk premiums among the monetary union members have 
been coherent and increasingly integrated despite the remaining structural 
differences between the members. Analyzing is accomplished by measuring the 
risk premiums from the government bond market yields between EMU 
member states and Germany which are then compared to each others before 
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and during the 2010 started crisis. More specific details about the methods are 
presented later in the study (in Ch. 4). 
 
Based on the risk premia analysis the grounds for the thesis are set when the 
effect of the financial crisis is considered. Ignoring the previously noticed 
integration it is now expected that the 2010 crisis has strongly increased EMU 
government bond yield spreads with respect to the previous financial crisis. 
Thus the first hypothesis is the following: 
 
H1: The 2010 started financial crisis in Europe has strongly increased the 
spreads of EMU government bond yields 
 
Secondly more evidence is sought to support the assumption that the addressed 
financial crisis effect is because of the country-specific features. This will be 
done by presenting and testing an econometric model where are included a few 
economic indicators in addition to two other variables, all acknowledged credit 
quality factors in previous literature (see Ch. 3). Hence the model’s factors are 
solvency, liquidity and international risk measured with independent variables 
such as debt-to-GDP ratio and public deficit figure, trading volume and change 
in market yields of the United States 10-year government bond. These variables 
are used as explanatory variables in a linear regression where the risk premium 
of government bond yield is the explained variable. 
 
The regression aims at estimating the risk premium while used to test the 
second and the third hypothesis. Based on theory and previous studies (e.g. 
Bernhardsen 2000, Codogno et al. 2003 and Barrios, Iversen, Lewandowska & 
Setzer 2009) it is expected that solvency positively correlates with the risk 
premium whereas liquidity and international risk factors have negative 
coefficients. Furthermore, in similar studies (e.g. Fisher 1959, Lemmen & 
Goodhart 1999, Barrios et al. 2009) the model validation and significance have 
been relatively high. Thus it is expected the model would provide the evidence 
to support the assumption about country-specific features if those factors have 
statistically significant expected signs and are developing as can be assumed in 
the current financial crisis. Moreover, as already mentioned, the evidence from 
regressions is also used to test whether the pricing of EMU government bonds 
has been correct and rational over the recent years. 
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The second and the third hypothesis are: 
 
H2: Changes in the credit quality factors explain the observed changes in 
EMU government bond yield spreads during 2007−2010 
 
H3: The market pricing of EMU government bonds is consistent regardless of 
the explaining factors’ information frequency 
 
The primary gain of this thesis is the evidence from side effects of critical and 
large crises among countries which share the same currency risk. The gain 
should not be underestimated in possible future cases where EMU or another 
economic and monetary union is going through a crisis time or planning to 
expand further. In addition, the goal of this analysis is to identify the 
determinants of yield spreads whereas to see how depending they are on the 
credit quality factors and especially on the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
criterias. In other words, the thesis tries to suggest that the fiscal stance should 
explain a significant amount of the yield spread. This idea works as the 
motivation also since the SGP being a mutually agreed contract which has not 
been honored by member states of EMU and thus these states should have been 
‚punished‛ with higher interest rates by the markets. 
 
Furthermore this thesis can be expected to serve some institutional investors 
who have significant positions in government bonds and face similar crisis in 
low risk areas as seen in the 2010 sovereign debt crisis in Europe. The benefit 
for market participants may arise from the findings of how much investors are 
influenced by various aspects of bond quality and especially the fiscal policy 
factors. As a whole, the purpose of the study is to produce additional 
information about behavior of bond yields in a single currency area for the use 
of investment management.  
 
 
1.2. Structure of the study 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as following. Next section (2) discusses about 
the theory related to bond valuation and European government bond market 
together with the basic terminology and short description how the 2010 
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financial crisis was evolved. A review of the previous studies concerning the 
topic is presented in section three. In the end of the third section one can find a 
summary of the previous studies. Fourth section presents and analyzes more 
closely the yield spreads and the studied risk premium factors with summary 
from the results of the analysis. In section five, the econometric models are 
constructed and results presented. Section six concludes. 
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2. BOND MARKET AND EMU 
 
This section discusses about the theory and the context related to both bond 
valuation and government bond markets in EMU. In the beginning bond 
characteristics are shortly described together with the basic terminology. The 
section ends in a brief review of how the financial crisis culminated into the 
2010 sovereign debt crisis in Europe. 
 
 
2.1. Bond characteristics 
 
Bond is a type of debt security which is used by public authorities, credit 
institutions and companies to finance their long-term investments or current 
expenditures, as typically is the case with sovereign (government) bonds. Bonds 
are usually issued in underwritings on primary markets where investment 
banks buy the whole debt from the borrower and re-sell it in fractions to 
investors on financial markets (in this context known as secondary markets). An 
alternative way to issue a bond is to arrange an auction, called a public sale, 
where investors may bid for the bond. 
 
Bonds differ by their defined term, i.e. maturities which are ranging up to 30 
years. The maturity can be any length of time but debt securities with 
maturities less than one year are generally designated as money market 
instruments. During their maturity bonds usually provide fixed income, 
coupon, why the bonds are often called fixed-income securities. This is mainly 
the case of government bonds where the coupon is a regular interest payment 
of the debt and is determined as some percentage from bond’s par value. The 
par value, or principal, is the amount of money which is paid back at the 
redemption (maturity) of a bond. In some cases (floating rate notes) the coupon 
can be tight to a money market reference rate or a bond can lack the interest 
payments totally (zero-coupon bonds). Zero-coupon bonds tend to be more 
common on secondary markets. (Bodie, Kane & Marcus 2011: 439−440.) 
 
The most famous bond is no doubt the U.S. government’s Treasury note, also 
known as the ‚T-note‛ whereas in Europe similar status is enjoyed by the 
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‚Bund‛, a bond issued by the government of Germany. Both of these 
benchmark bonds have 10-year maturities starting from their issuance. 
 
 
2.2. Bond valuation and term structure of interest rates 
 
Bond valuation means the determination of the fair price of a bond and is 
calculated as in Equation 1. below. As with any security or capital investment, 
the theoretical fair value of a bond is the present value of the stream of cash 
flows it is expected to generate. Valuation is always inevitable since the possible 
return of an investment, measured with yield to maturity (YTM) in context to 
bonds, cannot be defined without the fair price. To determinate the fair value of 
a bond, all of its future cash flows, i.e. coupons and/or par value, need to be 
discounted to the present. Therefore it is essential to know the discount rate (the 
interest rate, r) which can be derived from an analysis called the term structure 
of interest rates. Though the yield of a bond and the discount rate appear to be 
synonyms they have a meaningful difference in theory that is to come. When 
time until each coupon is paid is denoted with t and T is the maturity period, 
the bond value can be written as 
 
(1)  
   T
T
t
t
r
valuePar
r
Coupon
valueBond




 111
 
 
The basic idea behind the term structure of interest rates is that the yields to 
maturity of longer maturity bonds consist of yields for shorter maturity bonds. 
To help perceive this, an example of action called ‚stripping‛ follows. Stripping 
means the separation of the coupons of a whole Treasury bond (i.e. a fixed-
income security) to their own independent zero-coupon bonds. When each of 
the coupons is stripped and valued as an individual security, a zero-coupon 
bond, the sum of their market value plus the market value of the par value of 
the whole bond discounted with the same yield to maturity as the last coupon 
payment, should be equal to the value of the whole bond where the zeros were 
origin stripped from, even the yields may vary. This assumption rests on the 
Law of One Price which is defined by Bodie et al. (2011: 1001) as ‚the rule 
stipulating that equivalent securities or bundles of securities must sell at equal prices to preclude 
arbitrage opportunities‛. However the stripping needs to be done to define spot 
rates and consequently short rates. (Bodie et al. 2011: 481−482.) 
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The spot rate, yn, is the yield to maturity on zero-coupon bonds meaning that 
annualized interest rate what an investor will have on her zero-coupon 
investment if bought now and held until the maturity (n, years). Hence the spot 
rate is the interest rate which was used in stripping to determine the fair value 
of each zero. If the spot rate is known the market value, i.e. the present value of 
a zero-coupon bond can be calculated with slight change from Equation 1. as 
 
(2)  
 Tr
valuePar
valueBond


1
  
 
Based on the Law of One Price the price difference now, and hereby the 
expected returns for different maturity bonds, needs to lead equal results 
regardless of which investment strategy is used by investors. For example, there 
should be no difference in terms of returns whether an investor buys now a 2-
year zero-coupon bond or invests in a 1-year zero-coupon bond on consecutive 
years. This in turn gives an indication what might be the interest rate for a        
1-year zero-coupon bond one year from now. This future interest rate, needed 
also for the discounting, is called the short rate, rn, and its relation to spot rates 
is defined below in Equation 3. where it comes clear that the yields of longer 
maturity bonds consist of the yields of shorter maturity bonds, as 
 
(3)  )1(...)1()1()1()1( 321 n
n
n rrrry   
 
where n denotes the period in question and yn is the yield to maturity of a zero-
coupon bond with an n-period maturity. Thus y1 always equals r1. This relation, 
illustrated also in Figure 3. on the next page, can be shortened by using the 
previous time spot rate leading to Equation 4., 
 
(4)  )1()1()1( 11 n
n
n
n
n ryy 

 . 
 
Afterwards it is possible to define any period’s short rate based on the yields of 
zero-coupon payments by transforming Equation 4 to Equation 5. 
 
(5)  
1
1 )1(
)1(
)1(



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n
n
n
n
n
y
y
f . 
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Since the actual future’s short rates, rn, are always uncertain as is the nature of 
future, the name and the notation used in theory for the expected or defined 
short rate is the forward interest rate, fn. 
 
Here was the basic idea behind the bond valuation and the interest rate 
derivation. However since the real world is uncertain, the actual short rate that 
will prevail in the future rarely equals the forward rate, which is calculated 
from today’s data. Because of this issue few theories about the term structure 
are developed and those are shortly presented next. (Bodie et al. 2011: 482−487.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Short rates versus spot rates (Bodie, Kane& Marcus 2001: 455). 
 
 
2.2.1 Theories of the term structure 
 
Above an example was used where it was assumed in name of market 
efficiency (no free lunches) that there should be no difference in terms of returns 
regardless what maturity bond and which strategy the investor will choose. 
However, since the future interest rates are uncertain in the real world the 
investor cannot be sure whether the 2-year zero-coupon bond will yield the 
same, more, or less after the first year, than the 1-year zero-coupon bond 
bought one year from now. Thus there is more risk in investing in longer 
maturity bonds than in shorter maturity bonds. It can be that the interest rates 
of the 1-year zero-coupon bonds will rise and then the fair value of the 2-year 
zero-coupon bond is not worth as much after the first year as previously 
expected. Therefore at the redemption the investor will have the yield that was 
24 
 
locked in the beginning whereas another investor who rolled over the 1-year 
zero-coupon bonds on two consecutive years will have larger returns. 
Obviously if this would be the case the investors willing to invest in longer 
maturity bonds would certainly demand a higher return from the interest rate 
risk they are carrying. Thus there needs to be difference between forward rate 
and expected short rate, E(rn). This difference is named liquidity premium, 
which refers to the ability to sell an asset easily with predictable price. Since 
longer maturity bonds carry greater price risk (interest rate risk), they are 
considered less liquid in this context and therefore need to offer a premium. 
 
Consequently the forward rate may be considered as the sum of two 
components, the expected short rate and the liquidity premia. In respect to this 
view it is relatively easy to present the theories of the term structure. There are 
three main economic theories attempting to explain how yields vary with 
maturity. Two of the theories are extreme positions, while the third attempts to 
find a middle ground between the former two. The first and simplest theory is 
the expectations hypothesis where a common version of it argues that liquidity 
premiums are zero. Hence the name of the theory since it states the forward rate 
equals the market consensus expectation of the future short interest rate. So the 
forward rates derived from today’s long-term spot rates (YTM) can be used to 
infer market expectations of future short rates (Bodie et al. 2011: 490−491). 
Accordingly the hypothesis assumes that the various maturities are perfect 
substitutes and thus neglects the risks inherent in investing in bonds; the 
previously mentioned interest rate risk and reinvestment risk.  
 
The second theory named liquidity preference assumes that while long-term 
interest rates reflect market expectations about future short interest rates, 
investors also have investment horizons and therefore follow their investment 
strategies. This creates preferences for different maturity bonds and is then 
contrary with the perfect substitute assumption of the previous hypothesis. The 
liquidity preference theory also asserts that short-term investors dominate the 
market and thus a liquidity premium is demanded for holding long-term 
bonds. Therefore the premium, the excess of fn over E(rn) is predicted to be 
positive (Bodie et al. 2011: 491). In theory this premium needs to compensate 
investors not only for the interest rate and the reinvestment risk but also for the 
higher risk of credit loss from holding a security for a longer period. Therefore 
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questions arise when long-term rates fall below short-term and the expected 
short rate exceeds the forward rate leading to a negative liquidity premia. 
 
Because of the shortcomings of the previous theories there is a third one, the 
segmented market hypothesis. According to this theory the various maturities 
are not substitutable and as a result there exists independent markets for both 
shorter and longer maturity bonds. On these markets the supply and demand is 
based solely on the investors’ decisions on whether they prefer more liquid 
portfolios or longer-term investments. Although the market segmentation 
theory succeeds in explaining the usual market situation where short-term 
yields are lower than long-term yields, this theory fails to explain the observed 
fact that yields tend to move together whereas the first two theories explains it 
perfectly. 
 
In practice one does not need to rely on these theories and determine by self the 
correct discount rates used in bond valuation since spot rates are reported 
together with bond prices in financial press. However, while weighing which 
investment strategy would profit the most, an investor needs to consider what 
direction the interest rates are expected to move and what will the future short 
rates be. For the support of decision making a potentially powerful tool called 
yield curve is useful. Yield curve depicts the spot rates, i.e. current yields to 
maturities, of bonds with different maturity dates and interpolates the intervals 
where no maturity date exists. The most famous curve is no doubt the yield 
curve of U.S. government debt securities, jointly called the Treasuries. It is 
illustrated on the next page together with the yield curve of U.K. gilts (the debt 
securities issued by the Bank of England) in Figure 4. on two different days, the 
first and the last day of the observation period of the thesis. 
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Figure 4. The yield curves of U.S. Treasuries and U.K. Gilts. The inverted and flat curves are on 
January 1, 2007 whereas the upward rising curves are on December 27, 2010 (YieldCurve.com 
2011). 
 
 
The word potentially was used while first mentioning the yield curve because 
the curves live along with the interest rates’ fluctuation and thus is not stable. 
Actually the changes in the shape of the yield curves can be quite substantial as 
is seen during the four years in Figure 4. Here the outcome of active trading 
from shorter towards longer maturity bonds may have been much more 
profitable than investing only in long term since the short interest rates have fell 
relatively more. This outcome is simply inferential from Equation 1. in bond 
valuation where it is easily seen that a change in the discount rate causes an 
adverse change in the bond price. In fact this property of bond prices is 
progressive because a decrease in the interest rate results in a price gain which 
is larger than the price decline resulting from an increase of equal magnitude in 
interest rates. This relationship between bond prices and yields is called 
convexity because of the convex shape of the bond price curve and is 
demonstrated next in Figure 5. (Bodie et al. 2011: 448.) 
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Figure 5. The inverse relationship between bond prices and yields (Bodie et al. 2001: 425). 
 
 
However, while the yield curve reflects the current market expectations of 
future interest rates it can also reflect other factors. Recalling to the expectations 
hypothesis the current yields reflects only the expected future short rates but 
then for an example when upward rising yield curve it means always higher 
and higher future short rates. The liquidity preference had also the premium to 
explain this and thus next will be taken a closer look at premiums. 
 
 
2.3. Risk premiums 
 
Definition of the risk premium in theory is that it is the difference between an 
expected return and a certain return since by excess return is meant the 
difference between the realized rate of return on a risky asset and the actual 
risk-free rate. Therefore risk premium is the expected value of an excessive 
return. In practice by risk premium is meant the additional return demanded 
from a riskier asset compared to that of a less risky asset. In context to bonds 
the risk premium is often named yield spread, or yield differential, since it is 
calculated as the difference in yields between two bonds. The popular less risky 
asset used here is usually a so-called benchmark bond such as the T-note or Bund. 
(Bodie et al. 2011: 129.) 
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While the fixed-income securities are generally considered as less risky in 
comparison to for example shares or derivatives, the bond market is no 
exception to the risk-return trade-off. Also with government issued bonds, 
sometimes called risk-free assets, the credit quality and a specific bond’s risk 
level varies. Thus with a similar principle as on private capital markets where 
some enterprises are better borrowers than others, also governments differ in 
terms of bond quality. Because a better bond quality leads to a lower yield, risk 
premiums i.e. yield differentials arise and the amount of these are defined 
based on risk factors. Below are listed and explained most of the risk factors 
related to government bonds (Knüpfer & Puttonen 2009: 82−88; SIFMA 2011): 
 
Systematic risks 
 Interest rate risk (price risk) is the inverse relation shortly discussed in 
the previous chapter. The longer the bond’s maturity the greater its 
interest rate risk since the higher its price sensitivity. Thus the long-
term bonds tend to have a higher yield as well. The interest rate risk 
derives from the fluctuation of the expected return of investors. A 
measure for the price sensitivity is called the modified duration. 
 Inflation risk decreases the real yield since inflation causes depreciation 
of the future cash flows i.e. the future interest payments and principal. 
Thus the purchasing powers of the cash flows are less than at the time 
of investing. In addition, and especially at a time of economic growth, 
inflation usually leads to higher interest rates, which in turn lead to 
lower bond prices. 
 
 Currency risk derives from the possible currency fluctuation which 
affects the bond’s price during the maturity as well as it may 
depreciate the future cash flows 
 Reinvestment risk arises from a possibility of lower future interest rates 
than at the time when purchasing the bond. This means investors have 
to reinvest the received cash flows with lower expected returns. 
 Market risk is the risk that the whole bond market declines and drags 
the values of individual securities down with it regardless of their 
fundamental characteristics. 
 Timing risk refers to the risk that the bond’s price plummets after its 
purchase or peaks after its sale. 
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Unsystematic risks  
 Credit risk (default risk) is defined by Standard & Poor’s (2010) generally 
as ‚the failure to meet a principal or interest payment on the due date contained in the 
original terms of a debt issue.‛ In addition ‚Standard & Poor's considers a 
sovereign to be in default under any of the following circumstances: (1) For local- and 
foreign-currency bonds − − issued by the central government − − a sovereign default 
occurs when the central government either fails to pay scheduled debt service on the 
due date or tenders an exchange offer of new debt with less-favorable terms than the 
original issue.‛  
 Liquidity risk means such a lack of demand that it results in wide 
bid−ask spreads causing a liquidity premium when an investor wants 
to sell bonds. Typically the most liquid periods for bonds are right 
after issuance when the typical bond has the highest trading volume 
and when bonds are deliverable into the nearest-to-expiry derivatives. 
 Transaction risk is the risk of changes between subscription and 
payment which may lead to unexpectedly higher fees or excessive 
costs. 
 Selection risk is similar to timing risk but here the security 
underperforms for reasons caused by its issuer risk and could not 
have been anticipated. 
 Call risk is a risk existing only with callable bonds. Sometimes bonds 
may have a call provision entitling their issuers to redeem them at a 
specified price on a date prior to maturity. These bonds are usually 
more likely to be called when declining interest rates. 
 
All of these risks do not necessarily relate to EMU government bonds. For 
example when a European investor invests in euro-denominated EMU bonds in 
euros there is no currency risk. Other possibly absent risks are transaction risk 
and call risk since the first is more common among business-to-business 
operations and obviously the second does not exist if the bond is not callable. 
 
The most certain risks when investing in bonds and actually the ones that 
cannot be avoided are credit risk and reinvestment risk. Though regardless of 
the USA’s ever-growing liability of debt the U.S. government bonds are 
generally treated as free of default risk (Bodie et al. 2011: 461). However, 
avoidance of all the other risks demands that the investor purchases the bond 
straight from its issuance and holds it until the maturity. In addition the bond 
needs to be a U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Security (TIPS) to avoid the 
inflation risk. 
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Because it is a surprisingly complex process to define risk premiums, especially 
in such a way that the outcome would represent the fair value of a bond, and 
there are every market participants willing to learn this the demand for the help 
of independent credit rating agencies is obvious. These companies, namely 
Fitch, Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s, compiles ratings about governments 
and companies based on their risks and thus the uncertainty of their actual 
payments. The actual payments should be concerned uncertain as they always 
depend on some ultimate level on the borrower’s financial status. This 
uncertainty is analyzed in the light of today’s financial status and tomorrow’s 
outlook by the credit rating agencies and after a credit quality rating is 
awarded. The poorer the rating the higher the demanded interest rate on the 
markets usually is, and thus the larger the risk premium. The need for the credit 
rating agencies may had grown a somewhat unbearable since. To avoid conflict 
of interests these companies should stay independent from other market 
participants and the markets functionality sometimes may depend too much on 
the agencies’ faultless actions. Questions whether this has been the situation 
have been staged particularly after the subprime crisis in the US. This topic is 
shortly discussed in the end of this section when a review to current crisis is 
presented. 
 
 
2.4. EMU context 
 
EMU government bonds differ from the normal sovereign bond context largely 
because of the main feature of monetary union. A member in EMU is engaged 
to transfer the monetary authority in its entity to the European Central Bank, 
ECB. For a sovereign state this can be considered as having some positive 
implications as well as negative ones. The clearest positive implication coming 
along the mutual monetary policy is the common currency which eliminates the 
intra-market currency risk and is more stable than the sovereign’s own currency 
thus reducing the currency volatility outside the market area. A clear negative 
implication is that all the EMU governments are now exposed to liquidity crisis 
also and not only solvency crisis thanks to the mutual monetary policy. In 
liquidity crisis bond prices decline and thus the interest rates increase leading to 
higher interest expenses. A member state still has fiscal policy means though 
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(e.g. taxation and government borrowing) to guide its economy but since losing 
its ability to print money the member is also dependent on the actions of central 
bank. This layout creates a possible threat of systemic bank failures and/or 
credit defaults because governments are more likely to turn on additional 
borrowing in times of budget stress since their tools are limited. A prevention of 
mentioned situations should be in the interests of other members too since these 
could cause depreciation of common currency or a liquidity overspill onto other 
bond markets. (Lemmen & Goodhart 1999: 77−81.) 
 
To prevent situations like solvency crises and create creditability on the 
financial markets few actions were taken. First of all in the Maastricht Treaty, 
the Treaty on European Union, in 1992 was included a convergence criteria 
known as the Maastricht criteria. The criteria includes four main criteria 
presented in Table 2. which are the criteria for EU member states to enter the 
third stage of EMU and adopt the euro. To ensure the members keep respecting 
the Maastricht criteria, an agreement among the member states of EU taking 
part in Eurozone was made. This agreement is called the Stability and Growth 
Pact, SGP, and it consists of the public deficit and debt to GDP criteria from the 
Maastricht Treaty. Yet in addition an article 125 was included in the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, the Lisbon Treaty in 2007 and in the 
Treaty on European Union since Maastricht. The article 125 commonly known 
as the bail out clause clearly rules out the possibility of direct financial 
assistance from EU and thus from an EMU member to another. It is as 
important to note that since the Maastricht Treaty neither ECB is obliged to 
rescue any troubled members and thus not expected to inject liquidity into the 
system in cases of solvency crisis. 
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Table 2. The Maastricht Criteria (Article 121(1), 1992). 
 
1. Price stability: the inflation rate of a given Member state must not 
exceed by more than 1.5 % that of the three best 
performing Member states in terms of price stability. 
2. Government finance 
a) Annual government deficit: 
b) Government debt: 
 
the annual government deficit must not exceed 3 % of 
GDP. government debt must not exceed 60 % of GDP. 
3. Exchange rate: the Member state must have participated in the 
exchange-rate mechanism (ERM II) under the 
European Monetary System (EMS) for two 
consecutive years before the examination and should 
not have devalued its currency during the period. 
4. Long-term interest rate: the nominal long-term interest rate must not be more 
than 2 % higher than those of the three best 
performing Member states in terms of price stability 
 
 
 
With the yield spread in context to EMU government bonds is generally meant 
the difference in market yields between country i’s and Germany’s bonds. All in 
all these spreads can be caused by three main factors though the spreads vary 
cross-country and cross-time. The first factor is country-specific risk of default 
which is strongly related to the country’s fiscal vulnerability. Second is liquidity 
and it is also a country-specific factor even though it may be affected also by 
external matters such as liquidity overspills or crisis. Third factor is more a 
systematic one that changes with time and it is investors’ preferences and the 
markets’ reprising of the risk. (Barrios et al. 2009:2, Pagano & von Thadden 
2004: 546−548.) 
 
 
2.5. The sovereign debt crisis in the EU 
 
Grounds for the current 2010 crisis were casted as early as when the euro was 
taken in use in 2002. By that time right after the bursting of the tech bubble and 
as was seen in the introduction in Figure 1., the yield spreads between all the 
euro countries integrated and converged with the yield of German Bund. This 
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enabled the Border States, mainly southern European governments, to start 
raising capital for much lower interest rates than they were used to despite the 
borrower’s credit qualities. This of course led to higher indebtedness, especially 
in southern Europe. 
 
Nevertheless the global economy was growing and as the financial markets 
priced the risks among the euro countries more or less the same - in terms of 
market yields - the financial integration in the euro area enhanced (e.g. 
Codogno et al. 2003). At the same time in the United States a housing bubble 
was accelerating thanks to new credit derivatives that enabled banks to transfer 
the default risk of mortgages onward to investors. This created unprecedented 
liquidity on home loan markets since every savings and loan bank was cashing 
because they could award mortgages practically for everyone and then pass the 
default risks onward to financial markets. On the markets investment banks 
securitized these subprime mortgages to collateralized debt obligation (CDO) 
derivatives, obtained quality ratings from the credit rating agencies for them 
and passed on to investors. Obviously this scheme led to increasing house 
prices while the interest rates were at a relatively low level. London Interbank 
Offer Rate (LIBOR) being below 2 % in 2004 with the spread between T-bill rate 
(i.e. TED spread) near 0 % indicating healthy banking sector. (Bodie et al. 2011: 
14−19.) 
 
However, the interest rates began to rise in 2005 which started to brake the 
ever-growing housing prices. This of course lifted also the interest expenses of 
homeowners and thus delinquency rates in subprime mortgages started to 
accelerate in 2006. But the banking and insurance industry had also created 
another credit derivative called credit default swap (CDS) to hedge against the 
default risks and thus the markets remained calm. This did not last long since 
the whole system was suddenly short of collaterals when it emerged that the 
ratings of the CDOs had not taken into account the possible collapse of the 
whole housing markets of the U.S. In addition among the initial loaners was a 
large mass of insolvent homeowners who needed to default the whole 
mortgage at the same time with half-the-price house (collateral). In 2007 banks 
and hedge funds all over the world were found to be vulnerable because of the 
subprime loans. (Bodie et al. 2011: 18−21.) 
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As the financial crisis peaked in September 2008, the U.S. government needed 
to bail out the federal mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and 
private insurance company AIG while the large investment bank Lehmann 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy. Within days the U.S. government was pumping 
hundreds and hundreds of billions onto the markets and at the same time 
investors worldwide suffered losses not only because of the plummeting share 
prices but also because AAA-rated (the best possible credit rating) debt 
securities turned out to be worth nothing. Oldest and largest Wall Street 
investment banks, such as Merrill Lynch, were sold to each others in attempts 
to prevent the worst possible consequences. The capital markets froze up and 
companies could not raise even short-term funds since banks were either 
insolvent or unable to raise funds themselves. The recession was officially 
declared and because of the global capital markets its effects reflected on 
Europe as well. (Bodie et al. 2011:19−23.) 
 
In Europe the stock exchanges crashed likewise and in the aftershocks of the 
global financial crisis banks were forced to writedowns also in Europe suffering 
heavy credit losses. This created the need of excess borrowing for European 
governments since several banks needed to be bailed out to cut the further 
freezing on the capital markets and economies were stimulated in an attempt to 
prevent the recession. For a while it looked like the markets were correctly 
pricing the risks since the government bond yield spreads increased 
substantially (this is demonstrated later in section 4. in Figure 7.) in early 2009. 
The governments’ aid packages after all calmed down the markets and the 
spreads converged again. (Barrios et al. 2009: 2−5, Vits & Anstey, (2010)2010.) 
 
However, the increased borrowing of governments and especially in the case of 
southern Europe, started to develop fears of a sovereign debt crisis in Europe in 
late 2009. Because of the global financial crisis the gross domestic products 
(GDPs) were dropped at the same time when indebtedness had increased. 
Therefore ratios such as the debt-to-GDP (dtG) describing the solvency of 
governments were far from what was mutually agreed among the EMU 
members in the SGP. To top of the situation, the new government of Greece 
publishes on 21 October 2009 that its last year’s public deficit is twice the figure 
what was originally reported. Consequently the credit rating agencies 
downgrades the ratings of Greece. 
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In early 2010 volatility starts to stick the interest rates of the other euro 
countries also as the fears grow further. Greece announces its strict means of 
fiscal policy in fighting against the growing indebtedness. A month later it is 
revealed that Greece had paid hundreds of millions of dollars for different 
banks for hiding its actual level of borrowing from EU. Regardless as the 
general situation does not change, Greece is forced to ask help from the EMU. 
Shortly after its bonds are dropped to ‘junk’ grade and it is bailed out by EU 
and IMF. At the same time Portugal’s rating is downgraded and in the end of 
2010 Ireland is granted a bail out package. It became slowly certain that the 
countries could not have survived from their massive debt burdens alone but 
yet they enjoyed from very modest interest expenses in terms of market yields 
only a year before. 
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3. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 
Most of the studies on the integration of financial markets have concerned 
equity markets. Although thanks to EMU’s influence, the credit markets have 
also gained growing attention especially over the past years. On these markets 
the European government bonds have been undoubtedly the most popular 
target of integration measurement. Still the difference is that research on 
integration on bond markets is modest compared to integration studies on stock 
markets. 
 
In this chapter will be discussed relevant previous studies related to the subject. 
Discussion starts from general view to research area related to bonds 
proceeding more specific area and different aspects concerning the integration 
on financial markets and in EMU context. Towards the end of the chapter the 
weight goes naturally on government bond markets integration in EMU. 
 
 
3.1. Seminal bond research 
 
To begin with here is a shortly reviewed study which can be perceived as one of 
the seminal papers since many studies afterwards have based on this. It is 
Lawrence Fisher’s paper which was published in 1959. He tested a hypothesis 
about the determinants of risk premiums on corporate bonds. The risk 
premium was measured as the market yield spread between ‚riskless‛ U.S. 
treasury bonds. As explanatory determinants was used firms earnings 
variability, period of solvency, equity/debt ratio and the market value of all the 
bonds outstanding (i.e. publicly traded). The feature what made it seminal was 
the same sort of what this master thesis is aiming to determine and it was 
described by Fisher (1959: 218) as follows: ‚this is the first time they (i.e. the 
explanatory variables) have been used together in an attempt to discover how much 
investors are influenced by various aspects of bond quality”. Thus the actual tested model 
was a linear regression and it was intended for estimating the average risk 
premium on a firm’s bond by the four variables mentioned. 
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Fisher used cross-sectional data with five different time sections between 1927 
and 1953. The data consisted of only industrial corporations’ bonds in the U.S. 
because public utilities and governments were not considered to be exposed to 
default risk that time due to regulatory reasons. The regional restriction was to 
exclude the currency risk. 
 
As results Fisher was able to explain more than 70 % of each cross-sections’ risk 
premium with the model. The correlations of coefficients were as expected and 
agreed by economists, so that the earnings variation was the only determinant 
that was positively correlated with the risk premium. As the main conclusions 
Fisher noticed that economic and statistical methods are appropriate to security 
analysis. Moreover it was proven even the methods could not indicate rational 
investor behaviour that, at least in the bond market, the coefficients in respect to 
the risk premium are relatively steady over time. Worth noticing here is that the 
data’s time sections comprehended sections before, during and after the Great 
Depression. 
 
 
3.2. Government bond and integration research 
 
Bernhardsen (2000) studied European government’s interest rate differentials 
relationships to macroeconomic variables in the context of European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM). Consequently the time period was from 1979−1995. His 
panel data consisted of macroeconomic variables (the rate of unemployment, 
the real income growth differential, the relative labor costs, the inflation 
differential, the current account and the public deficit) from nine European 
countries. The countries used were France, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Great Britain, Norway and Sweden. The macro factors 
were regressed against the interest rate differential and as the interest rate 
differential was used the 12 months interest rate spread between Germany. The 
regressions were done twice calculating for slightly different interest rates, the 
yearly average and the last observation of the year. Other data was with yearly 
frequency because of the data availability and ‚overlapping data problem‛ 
(Bernhardsen 2000: 290−291). 
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As his methodology Bernhardsen analyzed the panel data using linear 
regression models. In the regressions country specific ‚fixed effects‛ (dummies) 
were used and they were run twice again. First having all the countries in the 
same group and later having two groups where the ERM membership was the 
separating factor. Stationarity of the factors was tested with panel data suitable 
Dickey-Fuller and Lewin & Lin tests. 
 
Bernhardsen wanted to find more relevant evidence from the relationship 
between interest rates and macroeconomical factors. As his hypothesis was that 
interest rate differential depends on domestic macroeconomic variables. This 
suggests governments may affect the domestic interest rates by conducting the 
appropriate policy. If this does not hold and there is no relationship, a 
government’s chances to influence the interest rate are small. 
 
The results of Bernhardsen’s study argued that all the macroeconomical factors 
have statistically significant effects to the interest rate differential. The most 
important explanatory variables with a clear effect were the real income growth 
differential, the relative labor cost, the inflation differential and the current 
account whereas the current account was the only variable with negative sign. 
Moreover based on all tested models the real income growth and the inflation 
had statistically strongest evidence. Almost as strong evidence was founded for 
the current account to have negative effect on the interest rate differential. All in 
all the results were roughly the same for all the models with an exception 
concerning the public deficit. The debt-to-GDP had a positive significant effect 
only for the countries outside ERM. This indicates that compared to non-
members, ERM countries can handle larger public deficits without facing an 
increase of depreciation expectations and the interest rate differential. This may 
have given ERM countries more flexibility in fiscal stabilization policy 
compared to the outsiders (Bernhardsen 2000: 303). In addition the study 
contained speculation about exchange rate policy creditability which was based 
on the dummy factors. However there were unclear results whether or not the 
ERM was sufficient system to produce such creditability. 
 
The findings were more promising than results in previous studies where as the 
measures for interest rate differential were used short-term rates. It can be that 
the macroeconomical factors explain long-term interest rate differentials better 
than short-term differentials. For example, in case of inflation, it can be 
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considered that if inflation today influences expected inflation in the future, 
inflation today may have a stronger effect on long term interest rates than on 
short term interest rates. Hence the effect of the inflation differential on the 
interest rate differential will be stronger for interest rates at 12 months maturity 
than for interest rates at 1 month and 3 months maturity (Bernhardsen 2000: 
302).  
 
As the contribution Bernhardsen found strong evidence for the hypothesis that 
a government’s policy affects the interest rates. The explanation was that all the 
studied macroeconomic variables may influence depreciation expectations and 
consequently the domestic interest rates. Because Bernhardsen’s findings were 
stronger and more promising than in previous studies there is a clear indication 
that macroeconomic variables explain long-term interest rate differentials better 
than short-term differentials. 
 
Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009) were motivated by the ‚on-the-run liquidity 
phenomenon‛. The name is to describe a pattern identified in previous studies. 
According to this phenomenon there are pronounced liquidity differences 
across government securities so that the most recently issued bond of a 
particular maturity tend to be much more liquid than the earlier issued ones. 
Because liquidity being a valuable factor for market participants, especially 
during market stress, the better liquidity results in liquidity premia (i.e. 
premium) thus having an important implication for bond pricing. Previous 
studies based mainly on evidence from the U.S. treasury market. 
 
In contrast Ejsing and Sihvonen concentrated on the liquidity of German 
government bonds as a purpose to provide new insights to the topic. These 
securities were considered especially interesting for two reasons. At first the 
German government bonds are gained the benchmark status among euro 
interest rates as are U.S. government securities in dollar rates (Ejsing & 
Sihvonen 2009: 14−19). But second, the market structures between the securities 
of these two issuers differ considerably. The most notably difference is the 
relative size of futures market to cash market, that is in U.S. 56 % and 985 % in 
Germany. This implicates a possibility to liquidity spillovers in terms that 
bonds which can be deliverable into the futures contracts undergo a significant 
peak in their liquidity when the bonds become deliverable. Studying this 
feature Ejsing and Sihvonen formed following two hypotheses. The German 
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futures market gives rise to significant liquidity spillovers to the bond market 
and these liquidity effects are reflected in the prices of German government 
bonds as the liquidity premia. Moreover they assessed whether the 
determinants of liquidity premia changed during the financial crisis. 
 
The study was actualized with liquidity data collected from two different 
sources. From an electronic trading venue, MTS, bond trade data was obtained 
at intra-day frequency between January 2006 and September 2008. This 
included approximately ten million quotes (depth of daily quotes and quoted 
bid-ask spreads) and sixty thousand trades on German government bonds. 
Furthermore traded volumes were obtained from Datastream because the MTS 
transactions represent only a fraction of the overall trades. Trading volume 
covered the period from January 2002 to February 2009. 
 
The liquidity was measured all in all with four different meters: traded 
volumes, quoted depths, quoted bid-ask spreads and a liquidity index. To 
assess the determinants of liquidity a panel regression model was used with 
seven different regressors. These included besides time to maturity, 
seasonedness and issue size four dummies for: time, deliverability, cheapest-to-
deliver and on-the-run status. Identical analyzes was also conducted for a 
control country (France) to ensure findings. Strongest evidence was found 
when explaining the traded volumes despite the high validity (over 73 %) of 
every model. The results suggested the liquidity of German bonds which 
became deliverable into the futures contracts rose higher than those of not-
deliverable. Moreover this impact was consistently higher for German bonds 
than for the control country which lacks a future market and the positive 
relation between deliverability and liquidity increased in the crisis sample. 
 
Ejsing and Sihvonen also compared German bonds yields to those of France 
due to similar fiscal fundaments and lack of a bond futures market to find out 
the possible spillover reflection. They calculated yield spreads between the two 
countries and pooled their data to a panel which included observations during 
the shorter time period so after splitting that it was possible to compare the 
results in pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. The spread was then tried to explain 
by credit risk, liquidity measure, average issue size and deliverability to futures 
contract in a regression. In pre-crisis period the liquidity was found not to be 
statistically significant and overall validity of the model remained below 70 %. 
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However in post-crisis period subsample all the coefficients were strongly 
statistically significant and had the expected sign. Liquidity and credit risk were 
positively correlated with the yield spread and so were the deliverability 
coefficients (which were dummies based on the maturity of the bond). The issue size 
was negatively correlated and three times larger than in pre-crisis sample 
indicating that large float grew importance in times of market stress. What was 
perhaps the most notable in post-crisis sample, where the model explained 75 % 
of the spread, was that the convenience yield for the 10-year bond was as high 
as 6 basis points. Together with the future deliverability premium the total 
convenience yield for long-term deliverable bond could well be 8.2 basis points. 
This indicates relatively strong liquidity premia in German government bond 
yield in crisis time. 
 
As their conclusions Ejsing and Sihvonen noted that the ‚on-the-run liquidity 
phenomenon‛ did not appear in the German government bond market. Instead 
they found strong evidence about yields of German government bonds being 
closely related to their eligibility for futures contract although they could not 
fully explain the liquidity premia with their variables. Also the economic 
importance of liquidity and deliverability emphasized clearly under severe 
market stress, here the 2007 financial crisis.  
 
Björkstén (2000) documented integration in the EU, the US and Canada. His 
approach was to analyze real convergence in mentioned economic zones and to 
produce benchmark estimates for integration in EMU for upcoming 10−30 
years. As EMU is a specific system for convergence and a true part of 
integration on European markets aiming coherent productivity, income and 
price levels, Björkstén’s target was to estimate the concrete speed for the 
European convergence process. 
 
Real convergence was measured with GDP per capita and price levels in 
Europe during 1970−1997, with regional income per capita and gross state 
product in the United States during 1950−1998 and with provincial income and 
output per capita in Canada during 1961−1998. The data of Björkstén’s study is 
collected from the OECD, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (US Department of 
Commerce) and the Statistics Canada. As used methodology were linear panel 
regressions where the dependent factor was the annual change in the 
productivity gap between a country/region/province and average. Regression 
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methods were seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), and generalized least 
squares (GLS) when serial correlation caused biases. From Europe the data 
included EU15 countries (EU members in 2000) added with Norway, 
Switzerland and Iceland. 
 
First Björkstén examined real convergence and the mechanism for it in 2000. 
Afterwards the study proceeded to comparisons of the development of 
integration based on the above mentioned measurements and run the 
regressions to estimate the speed of real convergence for each economic zone in 
turn. Because of closer economic integration, increased trade, a diffusion of 
technology and best practices (namely in Europe) and especially migration 
(namely in the US and Canada) it is clear on every zone that the poorest and the 
richest areas (country/region/province) converges. This phenomenon creates, 
besides growth, inflation as well for the poorer areas. Based on the earlier 
results where the real convergence speed was determined to be around 2 % 
Björkstén conducted a simple simulation concerning EMU involving the faster-
growing Spain, Portugal and Greece. He expected these countries to achieve 
higher growth rate than the rest of the EU countries and still the countries’ real 
per capita would be 85 per cent of the euro area average by 2040. However 
based on the results the strengthening growth and inflation may cause inflation 
pressures for the whole euro zone. 
 
In the end Björkstén after all did not believe that real convergence in Spain, 
Portugal and Greece could cause problems for EMU since convergence in these 
countries has started already before 1990s. Though in his another simulation 
where he considered 13 candidates (e.g. Turkey, Romania and Balkan countries) 
for accession to the EU the convergence speed could substantially differ from 
the first simulation.  This simulation takes its place during 2020−2030 and 
estimates the range of convergence speed in Europe to be from 2 % per year to 
over 10 %. During this process trend inflation will be higher in the "catching-
up" countries starting to diminish from 5 % yearly inflation and temporary 
these countries may cause inflation pressures and shocks to the whole euro 
zone. While measuring integration with per capita GDP Björkstén believes the 
catching-up process nears completion by 2030, after which the related inflation 
differential is assumed to disappear. His simulation did not take into account 
any eventual changes to relative positions on the business cycle. 
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Goetzmann, Li and Rouwenhorst (2001) carried out a study where they 
examined the correlation structure of the world equity markets over 150 years. 
Because of such a long data period Goetzmann et al. starts from primary 
theories as well. Much of credit is given for Henry Lowenfeld’s 1909 published 
study and book which may well contain the first documentations of the co-
movement of securities from various countries and the first strategies to use in 
international diversification. As the purpose of the study was to examine how 
international diversification has actually fared over the world market history 
when modern academic research on topic has begun circa 40 years ago. In 
addition they wanted to study how well Lowenfeld’s and his predecessors’ 
strategies actually served investors over the last century and half i.e. how 
beneficial global diversification had been. Last Goetzmann et al. were 
considering whether there could be useful lessons for future found in capital 
market history. 
 
The data of the study was enormous as one can imagine when the studied time 
period is over 150 years and comprehending all the major world equity 
markets. The data was collected from four different sources; Global Financial 
Data, the Jorion and Goetzmann sample of equity markets, The Ibbotson 
Associates database of international markets and the IFC database of emerging 
markets. Their combined sample included more than 80 markets that appear to 
have existed at some time currently or in the past in Eastern and Western 
Europe, North and South America, South and East Asia, Africa and Australasia. 
The data was cross-sectional time series of returns from equity markets 
mentioned above. Self-evidently the used information had notable holes in it 
since very few markets had have proper indexes continuously for such a long 
time (say more than 100 years), or there have existed investable markets 
without record at all and vice-versa. 
 
In this massive documentary Goetzmann et al. had three contributions. First 
they wanted to document the correlation structure of world equity markets 
since 1850 to 2000, and this was driven by the lack of such data. The second 
contribution was to provide a decomposition of the benefits of international 
diversification. Thirdly they wanted to develop an econometric framework to 
test hypotheses about changes in correlation among different markets through 
time. After documenting all the returns and calculating the correlations they 
tested for constancy with a test based on the asymptotic distribution of 
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correlation matrix from previous studies. Final tests were accomplished with 
the data from four ‚core‛ countries: US, UK, France and Germany. Later the 
decomposition of the benefits of international diversification was made with 
three different scenarios to separate the effects of average correlation from the 
effects of increasing numbers of markets. The decomposition was calculated 
from the diversification ratio of the variance of an equally-weighted portfolio to 
average variance of a single market. This was needed because when analyzing 
the past benefits of diversification it is clear that more the markets one ads in 
his portfolio the more one benefits whereas this case could not continue to 
perpetuity since investment possibilities were limited for investors. So it was 
necessary to take into account how many markets there were available for 
example investors in the mentioned core countries. After this it was possible to 
calculate the decomposition of benefits in the past. The three scenarios included 
a portfolio where the investor hold an equal-weighted portfolio of four core 
countries and had limited diversification possibilities to only these markets; a 
portfolio with relaxed constraints so that there are diversification benefits of the 
‚average‛ portfolio of four whatever countries over time (in this sense there are 
an unlimited number of country indices available so that all idiosyncratic risk 
can be diversified away); a portfolio assuming an investor that holds an equal-
weighted portfolio across all countries in the sample at any given point in time. 
 
During the whole time period the average correlation for all available markets 
with a rolling window of 60 months was never over 0.5.  Closest to this 
correlation the world equity markets came during the Great Depression while 
the other peaks (~0 and ~0.4) occurring in the end of the centuries. All in all the 
average correlation changed through time quite dramatically. Other findings 
were that the benefits of international diversification are not constant and as 
mentioned earlier the benefits were highest when new markets became 
available for portfolios. When the opportunity set expanded, the diversification 
benefits of cross-border investing relied increasingly on investment in emerging 
markets. Based on the calculated diversification ratio the relatively greatest 
benefits were gained when the number of markets in portfolio was added from 
one to six, this applied for all the examined time intervals. In the end it was 
concluded that roughly half the benefits of diversification available today to the 
international investor are due to the increasing number of world markets and 
half is due lower average correlation among the available markets (Goetzmann 
et al. 2001: 20−21). 
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Bowe and Mylonidis (1999) investigated the level of integration which 
prevailed on the Ecu-denominated international bond market before the last 
third phase (i.e. the single currency) of EMU. They were motivated by the lack of 
a single benchmark yield curve which could have become a foundation for the 
pricing of debt securities in the single European capital market after the 
introduction of euro, where Ecu was converted into euro at an exchange rate of 
one-to-one. This kind of a benchmark yield curve is usually derived from the 
yields of government bonds as e.g. in U.S. However because of the unique 
character that European capital markets do not have Federal European 
government institution, whose debt links the yields and maturities on euro-
nominated bonds, constitution of such benchmark curve was left to market 
participants to decide. Consistently this eventually selected benchmark curve’s 
usefulness in pricing bonds is depending on how well the European 
government bond markets can be said to exhibit the characteristics of a single, 
co-ordinated and integrated capital market system. 
 
As said the study of Bowe & Mylonidis was carried out before the introduction 
of euro, more closely with data from March 1992 through January 1996. This 
time period was chosen because following the Maastricht Treaty the Ecu’s 
composition was frozen that time. The weekly data was obtained from the 
database of Bloomberg, consisting of yields of seven European countries: 
Denmark, Spain, Belgium, Norway, Italy, France and the United Kingdom. 
Tested time series were long-term nominal yields of government bonds with 
time to maturities of 3-, 5-, 7- and 10-years.  
 
Since considerable empirical evidence was found in previous studies that yields 
to maturity behave like integrated stochastic processes, Bowe & Mylonidis 
derived two definitions based on expectations theory to test for market 
integration. At first the Ecu capital markets were defined to be partially 
integrated if the yields moved together in the long-run. This cointegration of the 
yields were measured in two sets forming a defined Ecu benchmark term 
structure (UK, Belgium and France) and subsets of benchmark Ecu issues 
whose constituent securities possessed the same residual maturity. By using 
Johansen’s procedure of multivariate cointegration analysis they tested the 
definitions. Hence the first condition of fully integrated markets demanded a 
unique stochastic trend to be common for all Ecu bond yields. The second 
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condition for complete integration tested zero-sum restriction on the 
cointegrated vectors. 
 
The results of the cointegration analysis suggested that the various Ecu-
denominated government bonds yields were partially integrated in terms the 
yields being cointegrated. Among yield series with the same residual maturities 
a unique stochastic trend was found with the exception of the 3- and 10-year 
maturities indicating evidence of full integration for 5- and 7-year maturities 
and only partial integration for the formers. However the second condition for 
complete integration was rejected implying non-stationarity between the yield 
spreads. Possibly the rejection could have been explained by the failure of the 
expectations hypothesis or biases from free-floating currencies. Since the UK 
and Italy left the ERM in September 1992 and Norway never was a member. 
Anyhow the study simply did not contain enough evidence to support the 
complete integration hypothesis during that time period. 
 
 
3.3. Government bond yields integration in EMU research 
 
Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) studied the default risk of EU member countries 
on the eve of euro. They were motivated for their research the need to 
investigate how much effect the fiscal stance of governments has on the default 
risk. This was crucial that time since government bonds in EMU were thought 
to come subject to only default risk (instead of default and currency risk) along the 
introduction of euro. This was due to expectations that intra-EMU exchange 
risk will be zero and inflation risk would be the same for every country in the 
eurozone. As their contribution was to compare the government bond yields to 
the respective credit risk and define what amount of the yield can be explained 
by the default risk. For this factors likely affecting default risk were identified 
though they could not distinguish between credit risk and liquidity risk because 
of the lack of data on the volume of government bond issues.  
 
After a simple theoretical model for default risk a one-way and two-way fixed 
effects regression models were estimated. Relevant data was available from 13 
countries belonging to European Union (EU15 excluding Greece and 
Luxembourg) during 1987−1996. The explained default risk was measured in a 
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synthetic way by the spreads between 10-yr government bond yields over the 
corresponding interest rate swap offer rates of the same 10-yr maturity 
denominated in the same currency defined as the annualized redemption 
yields. The 10-yr bond yields were particularly chosen because European 
governments increasingly financed their debt at longer maturities and at 10-yr 
horizon. As explanatory variables were government’s tax raising capability, 
ability to control spending and debt management policies together with the 
degree of federal (EU) support, the capacity of the political system to produce 
coherent governments and the government’s socioeconomic environment. 
 
Because the default risk was measured in a synthetic way, Lemmen and 
Goodhart needed to have a key assumption that (1999: 82): ‚the credit risk of prime 
banks or corporations does not vary greatly from currency to currency so that fluctuations in the 
differential between the public sector debt rate and the fixed swap rate are assumed primarily 
reflects shifts in the credit risks of the former‛. This was essential also in terms to be able 
to compare the default risks between the countries. Another major assumption 
was that liquidity variations are negligible and was made because the model 
could not distinguish between credit risk and liquidity risk as mentioned 
earlier. 
 
As a part of their results of analysis and comparisons of long-term government 
bond interest rates, Lemmen and Goodhart noted among the member states of 
EU, the interest rates have strongly converged to German long-term interest 
rates already in the first half of 1998. From their paper was also found a 
statement made by IMF that the noted convergence was a result from 
fundaments created by EMU rather than other reasons such as excess liquidity. 
Their comparisons were made with EMU countries in addition to parallel 
sample of countries not belonging to EMU (i.e. Denmark, Sweden and UK). 
 
The results of econometric analysis were somewhat expected. Government 
default risk was found to depend positively on changes in gross debt and 
lagged variability of inflation. Negatively the default risk was related to lagged 
inflation and tax margin increases. Since government expenditure was too 
strongly positively correlated with government debt ratios it was left out from 
the final model as well the federal support which size is relatively modest in 
EU. The null hypothesis about the equality of country-specific fixed effects was 
clearly rejected. In the end the tests were ran in two samples to test robustness 
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since observations showed Italy being an outlier. The goodness-of-fit of the 
model also dropped significantly when Italy was not included but otherwise it 
was relatively high around 70 %. Lemmen and Goodhart concluded that the 
bond yield differentials are likely to continue within EMU despite the earlier 
mentioned evidence of narrowed yield spreads with Germany. This was 
thought to be because fade out of these spreads would require accepting a 
‚joint liability‛ of the EMU member states for each other’s debt. (Lemmen & 
Goodhart 1999: 91−92.) 
 
Codogno, Favero and Missale (2003) implemented their study in the same 
context. The disappearance of currency risk and integration of government debt 
markets in EMU. Their contribution was to search deeper for the determinants 
of the government bond yield spreads in an attempt to define these not yet fully 
converged spreads. Codogno et al. started their study from rationalizing the 
reasons for the eurozone yield spreads and by analyzing the actualized yield 
spreads since 1990s until December 2002 which also served as their timeline in 
the study.  
 
As the European bonds are perceived as imperfect substitutes the goal of 
creation of a mutual euro-bond market was seeing frustrated. Also an 
appropriate cost-minimizing debt management that could lead to narrower 
spreads via more efficient transactions was seen as a policy task. Therefore the 
study suggests that in addition to the belief of market participants about 
liquidity premia, default risk is a relatively important component of the spreads 
especially because due to EMU exchange rate factors and controls on capital 
movement were eliminated. Consequently the goal of the study was to identify 
the importance of the mentioned two factors in pre-EMU and post-EMU 
samples by using macroeconomic fiscal fundaments, international risk factors 
and liquidity factors as variables. 
 
The findings of Codogno et al. argued that fluctuations in the euro area bond 
spreads were mostly explained by changes in international risk factors such as 
US swap and corporate bond spreads relative to US Treasury yields. Also the 
importance of debt-to-GDP ratio was clear with three countries when used as in 
relation to the dtG of Germany. Substantial significant of default risk was 
perceived in case of Italy and Spain. Liquidity was found to have an effect when 
measured with trading volumes rather than with bid-ask spreads and France 
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was the only country to have the liquidity factor more important than the 
international risk. As a result the common currency was found as the cause for 
increased correlation among the euro countries. However the risk of default 
remained as a small important factor suggesting more structural integration in 
indebtedness is needed for further convergence of the yield spreads. Therefore 
Codogno et al. (2003: 527) believed that this risk component would continue to 
work as a deterrent for irresponsible fiscal policies. 
 
Barrios, Iversen, Lewandowska and Setzer (2009) provided an empirical 
analysis in the exact same context as this thesis. Only they focused on the 
government bond yield spreads and their developments during the previous 
financial crisis. The data reached from March 2003 until April 2009 with weekly 
data and from Q1’2003 until Q2’2009 with quarterly data. Eventually the 
following seven countries were included in the analysis: Austria, Belgium, 
Spain, France, Greece, Italy and Portugal while Germany also but as a 
benchmark. 
 
The factors used in the study of Barrios et al. were liquidity risk, credit risk, risk 
aversion on financial markets and a dummy representing crisis time. To 
measure the risk aversion an indicator was calculated where credit ratings of 
corporate bonds, stock market volatility and exchange rate volatility of the 
euro-yen were taken into account. To assess the liquidity risk bid-ask spreads 
were used and for the credit risk changes in 5-yr CDS contracts were measured. 
In addition with quarterly data few more factors were included in OLS 
regressions and these were fiscal balance, debt level and current account 
balances, all as a percentage of GDP. The fiscal data was from the Economist 
Intelligence Unit and was converted into weekly frequency by interpolation. 
 
The findings of Barrios et al. suggested that EMU government bond yields are 
strongly influenced by the international risk aversion on financial markets. The 
domestic factors, such as liquidity and credit risk, only became important 
during the crisis. Especially the role of fiscal factors was shown to grow 
importance with the level of general risk aversion, leading to discrimination 
between the EMU sovereign bonds when intense financial market turbulence. 
The researchers also noted that despite the easing conditions on the global 
financial markets towards the end of 2009 it seemed unlikely the integration in 
EMU yield spreads will revert to pre-crisis level in the future. This was mainly 
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because the integration of spreads was seen on an abnormal level before the 
crisis and because government debt levels had increased significantly in many 
countries when compared to pre-crisis period. 
 
All in all the econometric evidence provided by Barrios et al. yielded high (>0.7) 
goodness-of-fits with quarterly data while the weekly data produced much 
lower R2s. Also a clear difference between the significances was obvious since 
most of the coefficients were significant at 1 % level in quarterly results while 
none in weekly results. Hence the data frequency played undisputed role in the 
study. 
 
On the next page a summary from previous literature is presented. The Table 3. 
draws main points, such as data, methodology and determinants, from each 
study discussed in this section. 
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3.4. Summary of the previous studies 
 
 
Table 3. Synopsis of the main points of the previous studies. 
Study Data Methodology Determinants Findings / Other 
Determinants of risk 
premiums on corporate 
bonds (Fisher 1959) 
cross-sections (5) 
between 1929−1953 
with industrial 
corporation bonds 
a linear regression 
with least squares 
method 
earnings 
variability, period 
of solvency, 
equity/debt ratio,  
bonds 
outstanding 
coefficients 
relatively steady 
over time 
despite the Great 
Depression 
The relationship between 
interest rate differentials 
and macroeconomic 
variables  
Bernhardsen (2000) 
1979–1995, 1-yr 
yields of 
9 European 
countries 
linear regressions 6 macroeconomic 
variable 
all variables 
significant, dtG 
affected positive 
only to non- 
ERM countries  
Liquidity premia in 
German government 
bonds Ejsing & 
Sihvonen (2009) 
liquidity data 
between Jan 2002 − 
Feb 2009 (German, 
France, US) 
panel regressions maturity, 
seasonedness, 
issue size and 4 
dummies (time, 
deliverability, 
price, status) 
no ‘on-the-run’ 
effect, but strong 
liquidity 
spillover related 
to Bund futures 
contracts 
Real convergence in the 
enlarged euro area 
Björkstén (2000) 
1950–1998,  
EU15 countries w/ 
Norway, 
Switzerland, 
Iceland 
SUR and GLS GDP and CPI of 
US, Canada and 
Europe 
convergence of 
East-Europe to 
EU more 
problematic than 
Spain’s, Greece’s 
or Portugal’s 
Long term global market 
correlations 
Goetzmann, Li & 
Rouwenhorst (2001) 
cross-sectional 
equity returns 
between 1850–2000 
correlation test, 
scenario analyses, 
diversification 
ratio 
equity markets  
all around the 
world 
avg. correlation 
for available 
markets never 
over 0.5 with a 
rolling 60 mos. 
Is the European Capital 
Market Ready for the 
Single Currency? Bowe 
& Mylonidis (1999) 
Mar 1992 − Jan 
1996 yields of  
7 European 
countries’ 
government bonds 
with maturities of 
3-, 5-, 7- and 10-yrs 
Johansen’s 
multivariate 
cointegration 
analysis 
benchmark yields 
(based on 
issuance and 
credit ratings),  
matrices of 
cointegrated 
vectors 
partial 
integration 
based on 
cointegration, 
full integration 
based on unique 
stochastic trend 
in yields, no 1-
to-1 relationship 
between yields 
Credit Risks and 
European Government 
Bond Markets Lemmen 
& Goodhart (1999) 
1987–1996  
10-yr bond yields 
& swaps of EU15 
(w/o Greece and 
Luxembourg) 
one-way and two-
way fixed effects 
regressions 
taxable capacity, 
government 
expenditure, gross 
debt, EU grants, 
inflation 
strong 
convergence to 
Germany, country-
specific features 
clearly matters 
Yield spreads on EMU 
government bonds 
Codogno, Favero & 
Missale (2003) 
Jun 1991 – Dec 
2002 10-yr bond 
yields of 10 EMU 
governments 
SURE with daily 
and monthly data 
debt-to-GDP 
ratio, spreads of 
US government 
bonds and US 
interest rate 
swaps & US 
corporate bonds 
EMU yield spreads 
mainly explained 
by international 
risk factors, 
increasing 
integration, default 
a small factor 
Determinants of intra-
euro area government 
bond spreads during the 
financial crisis Barrios, 
Iversen, Lewandowska 
& Setzer (2009) 
Mar 2003 – Jun 
2009 10-yr bond 
yields of 7 EMU 
governments 
OLS with weekly 
and quarter data 
liquidity risk,  
credit risk,  
risk aversion,  
crisis time 
dummy 
international risk 
aversion a main 
determinant, 
others grow 
importance 
during crisis 
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4. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
This section presents and documents the data. After presentation all the risk 
factors studied in the thesis are described and analysed carefully. Later the 
factors and observations are compared to each other and results reported. The 
aim of the section is to document the studied factors and give the reader a better 
understanding for upcoming chapters. 
 
 
4.1. The data of the thesis 
 
As related to the 2010 sovereign debt crisis, time period for the data used in this 
study is from January 2007 to January 2011. This time period alone allows the 
study to concentrate on the yield spreads during the financial crisis. This 
analysis of government bonds yield spreads bases on the long-term interest rate 
of selected EMU countries. More closely the market based yield on the 10-year 
government bond. The yields are analyzed as daily, monthly and quarter 
frequency. Later in the study where econometric methods are used the variables 
are calculated from monthly average and end of quarter figures. 
 
The selected countries represent the largest economies (GDP over 100 billion 
euros in 2009) in EMU and are illustrated in the Figure 6. The economy 
restriction is used because the bonds issued by smaller countries tend to have 
such a poor liquidity that it may well cause biases. After restricting Cyprus, 
Estonia, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia the selected countries are 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain and the Netherlands. During the thesis shortenings OE/AUS, BE/BEL, 
FI/FIN, FR/FRA, GE/GER, GR/GRE, IR/IRE, IT/ITA, PT/POR, ES/SPA and NL 
are used respectively. 
 
The data consists of market yields on the US 10-year T-notes and the monthly 
traded volumes of 10-year government bonds of the selected countries. These 
two variables represent systematic and international as well liquidity risk and 
are essential in the later econometric model when explaining the yield spreads. 
Also end of quarter values of debt-related factors, debt-to-GDP ratio and public 
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deficit figures, are included in the data. All the data is obtained from the 
databases of Datastream International, Eurostat and European Central Bank’s 
Eurosystem statistical data warehouse except the trading volumes which are 
also from Datastream, but eventually from International Capital Markets 
Association's (ICMA) launched TRAX system. 
 
 
Figure 6. 2010 GDP at market prices of 17 euro countries, in billion euros (Eurostat). 
 
 
4.2. Yield spreads 
 
In the context of EMU government bonds by yield spread is meant the risk 
premium which is the difference in bond yields between a euro country and 
Germany. The yields studied in this thesis are the yields to maturity of 
government bonds with a remaining maturity close to ten years. The interest 
rates are harmonised secondary market yields with the data consisting of daily 
and monthly observations. The daily yields are end-of-day rates whereas the 
monthly yields are the averages from these. In all analyses and tests basis points 
are used as the measured units. 
 
The actual spreads are depicted in Figure 7. on the next page where it is easily 
seen how integrated the yields were in the beginning of the time series. Also a 
shock in 2008−2009 and general broadening after 2009 can easily be observed. 
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Figure 7. (a-j) Daily yield differentials in the euro area during 2007−2010, in basis points 
(Datastream). 
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These spreads varied between -4 basis points and 300 bp with all the largest 
EMU countries after 2006 until the beginning of 2010. Then on 22 January the 
spread pipe broke when the 10-yr market yield on the Greece’s government 
bond hit 6.2328 % and so the spread with Germany (3.2069 %) grew to 303 bp. 
This is demonstrated in Figure 7. (e) where the spread first time crosses the 300 
points’ red line. For other than PIG countries the whole scale is up to 300 bp. 
 
Below in Table 4. are reported the descriptive statistics of yield spreads 
calculated from monthly averages. The statistics clearly brings forth the PIIGS 
countries since all the other EMU members have a maximum of around 1 % 
spread with Germany. While presenting the maximums between 2007−2009 and 
2007−2010 it is obvious that the spreads of the PIIGS have torn since the year 
2010 is included in the data. For Greece the adding of 2010 means 625 bp wider 
spread and for Ireland, Portugal and Spain 295, 272 and 137 basis points 
respectively. Also the maximum of Italy has risen a bit in 2010 while the 
spreads of all the other countries have not hit a new maximum. In addition for 
the first mentioned countries the difference between the two maximum is larger 
than the country’s mean during the whole period. Thus it is clear that the 
widening spreads must have affected to volatility as well and indeed standard 
deviation is doubled for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain when the 
observations of 2010 are included in the data. In fact the standard deviation of 
these countries had increased so much that it is on the level of the countries’ 
mean, or even above as for Greece and Portugal. For other countries except 
Belgium and Italy, the standard deviation decreased when 2010 was included. 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of yield spreads. 
AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA POR SPA NL
 Mean 41 49 29 29 235 141 84 110 68 26
 Median 43 47 28 32 133 148 84 66 57 23
 Maximum 114 111 80 63 910 569 169 438 247 69
 Max. '07 - '09 114 111 80 63 285 274 155 166 110 69
 Minimum 4 4 3 5 23 2 21 14 5 2
 STD 28 31 20 16 271 140 47 112 63 18
 STD '07 - '09 32 30 23 17 82 88 41 40 32 20
 Skewness  0.69  0.35  0.98  0.13  1.45  1.24  0.24  1.51  1.17  0.93
 Kurtosis  2.99  2.20  3.44  2.08  3.83  4.39  1.76  4.22  3.55  3.22
 Observations 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
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The distributions of yield spreads are right-skewed meaning the majority of 
observations lies to the right of the mean (more higher values than lower when 
compared to the mean) except in case of Italy whose distribution is symmetric. In 
kurtosis more variation is observed since depending on the country a negative 
and positive excess kurtosis (differing from the statistical value 3) exists. The 
distributions of France and Italy are the most platykurtic (flatter than normal 
distribution) ones whereas Ireland and Portugal have the most leptokurtic 
(peaked) distributions. 
 
In the upcoming empirical section the yield spreads are determined besides 
with monthly frequency also with quarter frequency. Therefore mean values for 
each quarter are computed from monthly observations. Obviously this 
modification smoothers the data and based on the Jarque-Bera test the null 
hypothesis of a normal distribution cannot be rejected at the 1 % significance 
level with all the countries. A significance level of 5 % could have been used but 
then the hypothesis of the normal distribution must have been rejected in the 
case of Portugal. The yields after the modifications are presented below in 
Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8. The yields of 10-yr EMU government bonds in 2007−2010 as quarter average (Data 
from Datastream).  
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4.3. Determinants of risk premia 
 
The studied risk premium factors are country i’s solvency, liquidity and 
international risk. These factors are measured with independent variables such 
as the published debt-to-GDP ratio and public deficit/surplus figure, trading 
volume and the change in the yield of the US T-note yield. These determinants 
are presented and analyzed more closely below. 
 
4.3.1. Solvency 
 
First is analyzed the solvency factor which is measured by debt-to-GDP (dtG) 
ratio and public deficit figure. Based on previous literature (e.g. Lemmen & 
Goodhart 1999; Codogno et al. 2003) these two variables are important factors 
in defining government risk premiums. Despite the low-frequency feature of 
these factors the total debt and government budget deficit are anyhow possibly 
the best factors describing the current and near future solvency of a 
government.  
 
Quarterly debt-to-GDP is defined as the total gross debt at nominal value 
outstanding at the end of each quarter between and within the sectors of 
general government as required by the Maastricht criteria. Classification of the 
data is in accordance with the European System of Accounts (ESA 1995) and it 
is transmitted by national authorities (national statistical institutes, national 
central banks or Ministries of Finance) for Eurostat within three months of the 
end of the quarter to which the data refer to. Thereafter data are validated 
before publication. The public deficit figure represents a government’s 
deficit/surplus which is the net borrowing/net lending of general government 
as defined in the ESA95. It is the difference between the revenue and the 
expenditure of the general government sector. Thus a government budget 
surpass is likely to create deficit and vice versa. 
 
On the next page in Figure 9. are depicted with earlier used colors all the 
quarterly dtG ratios of selected countries between Q4’2006 and Q4’2010 as 
published by Eurostat. Below the chart is also reported the actual data. As it 
becomes obvious the governments’ debts have grown during the observation 
period and all in all the whole range of dtGs has jumped around 20 % higher. 
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Figure 9. General government gross debt as percentage of government’s GDP according to the 
convergence criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty (Eurostat). 
 
 
Hence the late rising trend is seen in Figure 9. but moving averages of the dtG 
ratios highlight it even more while also clearly depicting the turning point. As 
can be observed below from Figure 10., after the Q4’2008 the rather steady 
development suddenly jumps when averages increase near 10 % in one quarter. 
This is a natural consequence following the increased government borrowing. 
 
 
Figure 10. The moving averages of EMU government debt ratios. 
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The increased borrowing in turn can be demonstrated with the public deficit 
figures presented in Table 5. Every quarter there is a country whose deficit is 
more than the -3.00 % agreed in the SGP (though the limit is at yearly level). 
Usually there are several but it is not before the Q1’2008 when most of the 
countries cannot keep their deficit below the 3 % limit. However the 
consequences of this overdraft are barely seen in the dtG ratios except for 
Belgium and Ireland. The second time when most of the countries have deficits 
more than -3.00 % is during the Q1’2009 and this time the effects are much 
serious. In fact the level of deficits increases further the two following quarters 
and this time it really reflects to the dtG ratios as well. This is the turning point 
seen in the moving averages and as discussed in previous chapter the peak in 
the yield spreads as well. At the end of 2009 Finland and Germany are the only 
countries who do not overdraft the SGP limit. And as the situation does not 
change a lot during 2010, similar or worse outcome can be expected to be in the 
end of the year. For this Figure 9. already provided some evidence. 
 
 
Table 5. The public deficit figures of selected countries in percentages of GDP (ECB 2011). 
 
 
4.3.2. International risk 
 
The only determinant of risk premia describing the systematic risk in this thesis 
is international risk. This can be explained similarly as in the study of Codogno 
et al. (2003: 514) that: ‚This specification is not motivated by a theoretical model, but by 
empirical evidence that risk tends to affect bond yields proportionally rather than additively. As 
international risk increases, all yield differentials generally widen. In particular, the empirical 
literature on sovereign bond spreads in emerging markets shows that the yield on US 
government bonds and/or the slope of the US yield curve are main determinants of sovereign 
2006Q4 2007Q1 2007Q2 2007Q3 2007Q4 2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2 2009Q3 2009Q4 2010Q1 2010Q2 2010Q3
Austria 0,18 -3,00 0,88 -3,06 1,04 -4,02 -0,11 -0,66 0,66 -7,22 -4,68 -4,77 -0,24 -10,77 -2,90 -4,88
Belgium 7,48 -8,93 5,15 -3,95 5,55 -8,05 4,78 -4,69 2,24 -13,83 -1,32 -8,58 -0,83 -10,54 0,57 -7,93
Finland -0,11 4,75 11,34 3,53 1,36 4,87 10,56 3,01 -1,79 -1,05 3,58 -4,69 -8,90 -2,64 2,39 -4,46
France 2,32 -6,84 -0,62 -5,01 1,20 -6,51 -0,76 -5,24 -0,97 -11,67 -6,56 -9,76 -2,54 -11,90 -6,19 -7,28
Germany -0,44 -1,16 2,10 -0,51 0,61 -0,56 1,91 -0,39 -0,51 -1,80 -1,40 -4,72 -4,06 -5,16 -1,12 -5,31
Greece -4,64 -8,11 -12,07 -3,24 -3,79 -10,94 -15,28 -6,26 -7,34 -16,51 -17,65 -14,07 -14,10 -15,67 -9,38 -8,11
Ireland 10,12 1,07 -1,88 -6,16 6,73 -5,40 -8,57 -11,18 -4,36 -13,43 -18,54 -15,87 -8,46 -39,09 -15,47 -36,90
Italy -6,09 -5,47 2,36 -0,31 -2,63 -5,64 -1,33 -1,48 -2,39 -9,47 -3,59 -4,22 -4,11 -8,53 -2,49 -3,36
Portugal -6,76 -5,02 -0,53 -1,97 -5,35 -4,28 1,33 -5,74 -5,80 -10,80 -8,41 -8,07 -13,13 -9,51 -10,64 -7,19
Spain -6,66 8,86 1,26 7,85 -9,23 6,48 -3,40 -1,33 -17,59 -0,45 -14,73 -6,96 -21,50 -2,03 -11,32 -4,51
The Netherlands 2,76 1,07 -2,60 -2,13 4,07 1,39 -0,27 -1,68 2,60 -2,56 -6,00 -8,89 -4,60 -3,67 -7,88 -8,30
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spreads. Blanco (2001) also uses yields on US corporate bonds as a proxy for global credit risk in 
modeling yields on euro zone government securities.‛ 
 
The idea behind using yields of US T-notes as a proxy for international risk 
derives from a financial phenomenon called flight-to-safety (flight-to-quality). 
This means an effect on markets that usually appears during financial stress 
when investors flee from riskier assets into investments that are considered as 
very safe or the safest possible. Consistently investors have long perceived the 
T-notes as one of the best safe havens among securities during market stress, 
because of their real interest, liquidity and relatively small risk. Therefore also 
in this thesis the change in yields of US T-note is used as the measure for global 
financial markets’ stress. 
 
As a consequence of flight-to-safety yields of less risky assets decreases since 
the increased demand for these raises their asset prices. This can be seen on the 
next page in Figure 11. where the yield of US T-note starts slowly to decrease in 
2007 and shortly after the eurozone sovereign (here without German Bund) 
bond yields start to increase together with falling share prices, here denoted by 
the Eurostoxx50 index. The latter is the cause of market stress when the values 
of risky assets depreciate most since investors are getting rid of them. 
Particularly well the phenomenon is seen in the end of the 2008 when after the 
collapse of the Lehman Brothers the yield of US T-note drops sharply and at the 
same time especially the bond yields of the PIIGS countries sharply jumps. 
After couple of months the European share market rocks the bottom. During 
the end of the 2009 an inverse effect of the phenomenon is seen when markets 
try to calm down while again it is seen starting on the spring 2010 now with all 
the PIIGS countries. Since the German Bund enjoys similar benchmark status to 
T-note it is expected that an increased international risk widens the eurozone 
yield spreads in terms of either price increase of Bund or price decrease of other 
EMU bonds or these both. 
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Figure 11. The yield of US T-note, yields of eurozone bonds (without German Bund) and the 
Eurostoxx50 price index, from Jan 2006 to Mar 2011 (Datastream). 
 
 
4.3.3. Liquidity 
 
Two possible data sets of liquidity were available. Since the studied yields are 
secondary market yields of government bonds with a remaining maturity close 
to 10-yrs would be logical to use the traded volumes of those exact bonds. Also 
this would be the only optional case if one were to study particularly these 
nominal bonds. However as this thesis concentrates on the risk premias of euro 
countries we may choose the better fitting set because another data set is the 
traded volumes of so-called benchmark bonds. By the benchmark bond is 
meant the most demanded and thus also the most traded bond series among all 
the bond series issued by the same government. The demand in turn can be 
measured with absolute trading volume or with bid-ask spread, called the 
market breadth and the market depth respectively. Usually the benchmark 
bonds have maturity near to 10-yrs but sometimes governments may have 
issued another series of bonds whose maturity is nearer to 10-yrs but still they 
have not gained the benchmark status for some reason. In this kind of situations 
the difference in maturities of the two series rarely is significant and especially 
here since the chosen benchmark bonds have anyway maturity ranging 
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between 8 to 12 years. The differences in trading volumes instead were much 
more significant (as seen in Figure 12. on the next page) and after running 
regressions twice with both series the results show that despite the yields 
having been calculated from another series the government’s 10-yr bonds’ risk 
premium was more depending on the volumes of the particular benchmark 
bonds. 
 
The observations are end-of-month figures for average daily trading volumes in 
absolute numbers of bonds traded for that particular month. The data is 
collected from Datastream but eventually from TRAX system which is a trade 
matching and reporting system for the OTC markets owned by the Euroclear 
group. TRAX processed over 847 million transactions in 2010 in a range of 
capital market instruments (Xtrakter 2011). The described two volume series for 
each country are illustrated in the next page’s charts in Figure 12. (a−k), where 
can also be noted the differences between these series. The darker shade always 
represents the trading volumes of benchmark bonds also used later in 
regressions. 
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Figure 12. (a – k) The differences in trading volumes between the two liquidity data set. The 
selected benchmark bond data is indicated with the darker shade (Datastream). 
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The motivation to use liquidity as one explaining factor bases on findings in the 
previous literature. Many papers (e.g. Beber, Brandt & Kavajez 2006; Barrios et 
al. 2009; Ejsing & Sihvonen 2009) suggest the importance of liquidity escalates 
to a considerable price premium in times of market stress. Also the studied data 
here reveals significant changes in liquidity after the market stress, caused by 
the global financial turmoil, started to accumulate. Generally the number of 
trades rocked bottom in 2008 when it at least halved with the benchmark bonds 
of Finland, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. In 2009 in this list joined Austria, 
Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands while for France the change in the 
number of trades was not so shocking. Strangely with Ireland the liquidity has 
increased during the whole studied period. In 2010 there was recoil in the 
liquidities of most of the countries however France being the only one whose 
benchmark bonds were traded more than at the starting level in 2007. Greece 
and Italy have clearly lost most of their liquidity since 9.3 billion trades 
decreased to 1.1 billion and 18.4 billion decreased to 5 billion during the 
observation period respectively. Other countries that lost more from their 
liquidity than Germany includes Austria, Portugal and Spain. The only 
countries whose liquidity decreased in 2010 were Austria, Greece, Portugal and 
the Netherlands.  
 
The liquidity is also analyzed based on its volatility. To observe the volatility in 
the number of trades a specific indicator of relative volatility is used and it is 
named Volatility-%. This ratio defines how significant the volatility has been 
with respect to total liquidity at yearly basis. Thus the ratio especially reveals 
extreme movements in liquidity at monthly level as well significant changes in 
the level of total liquidity. To interpret correctly the Volatility-% it is also 
needed to consider the average and standard deviation of liquidity together 
with the total liquidity, as all of them are presented in Table 6. 
 
Important notice arising from the use of Volatility-% is the substantially 
increased volatility of Finland and Greece, the ratio being 5.1 % and 9.6 % at the 
end of the 2010 respectively. In addition with Austria, Ireland and Portugal the 
average ratio during the observation period rose higher than at the starting 
level in 2007. 
 
By means of the ratio it is also possible to notice the benchmark status of 
German Bund. Even its absolute liquidity crashed and halved in the financial 
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crisis since 2008 along the other euro countries, the Volatility-% of Germany has 
solely stayed below 3 % every year and the last two years it remained as the 
least while being the most traded bond the whole time. In other words despite 
the freezing of the markets the liquidity of German 10-yr bonds has even 
stabled since the beginning of market stress.  
 
 
Table 6. The liquidity stats (data from Datastream). 
2007 2008 2009 2010
Austria mthly avg. 111 207 160           71 627 308              51 468 805              43 179 443              
mthly std (mil.) 38 45 26 15
total 1 334 485 920        859 527 690           617 625 660           518 153 320           
Volatility-% 2,88 % 5,27 % 4,28 % 2,95 %
Belgium mthly avg. 323 162 267           179 194 350           177 706 325           229 838 958           
mthly std (mil.) 101 60 63 88
total 3 877 947 200        2 150 332 200        2 132 475 900        2 758 067 500        
Volatility-% 2,62 % 2,78 % 2,96 % 3,20 %
Finland mthly avg. 73 454 560              32 048 879              36 624 175              42 409 317              
mthly std (mil.) 25 16 29 26
total 881 454 720           384 586 548           439 490 100           508 911 800           
Volatility-% 2,82 % 4,20 % 6,60 % 5,09 %
France mthly avg. 609 723 950           472 091 517           383 805 067           679 004 175           
mthly std (mil.) 192 196 132 171
total 7 316 687 400        5 665 098 200        4 605 660 800        8 148 050 100        
Volatility-% 2,63 % 3,46 % 2,87 % 2,10 %
Germany mthly avg. 2 421 408 417        1 479 544 525        1 090 026 117        1 279 212 467        
mthly std (mil.) 823 530 238 309
total 29 056 901 000      17 754 534 300      13 080 313 400      15 350 549 600      
Volatility-% 2,83 % 2,98 % 1,82 % 2,01 %
Greece mthly avg. 772 883 867           181 806 596           260 421 638           93 131 637              
mthly std (mil.) 460 96 144 108
total 9 274 606 400        2 181 679 150        3 125 059 660        1 117 579 648        
Volatility-% 4,96 % 4,42 % 4,60 % 9,63 %
Ireland mthly avg. 30 614 396              43 119 042              52 034 067              53 214 763              
mthly std (mil.) 17 15 23 18
total 367 372 754           517 428 500           624 408 800           638 577 160           
Volatility-% 4,71 % 2,89 % 3,69 % 2,87 %
Italy mthly avg. 1 532 968 075        409 362 342           390 524 225           413 033 333           
mthly std (mil.) 681 205 100 104
total 18 395 616 900      4 912 348 100        4 686 290 700        4 956 400 000        
Volatility-% 3,70 % 4,17 % 2,12 % 2,10 %
Portugal mthly avg. 135 402 121           69 740 456              59 034 297              47 775 401              
mthly std (mil.) 35 47 37 16
total 1 624 825 450        836 885 470           708 411 560           573 304 810           
Volatility-% 2,18 % 5,58 % 5,29 % 2,75 %
Spain mthly avg. 389 224 200           130 573 772           106 988 942           201 256 967           
mthly std (mil.) 204 92 45 62
total 4 670 690 400        1 566 885 260        1 283 867 300        2 415 083 600        
Volatility-% 4,37 % 5,88 % 3,50 % 2,56 %
The Netherlands mthly avg. 236 431 708           196 679 217           140 038 095           126 441 058           
mthly std (mil.) 117 86 46 39
total 2 837 180 500        2 360 150 600        1 680 457 140        1 517 292 700        
Volatility-% 4,14 % 3,63 % 2,77 % 2,57 %
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4.4. Results 
 
In this section became clear that there has been an upward rising trend in the 
yield spreads during 2007−2010 (see Figure 7.). However, it is not a 
straightforward trend since the global financial crisis caused a peak in the 
spreads in 2009 and then they reverted shortly after. This reversion anyway was 
only a temporary one since in the beginning of 2010 the spreads started to 
widen again. This time the observed widening was more discriminating since 
now especially the yields of the PIIGS countries rose more than before while the 
quarter averages of the yields of other selected countries remained below 4 %. 
 
Hence the analysis produces clear evidence with all data frequency that during 
market stress the yield spreads definitely differ. The evidence is supported even 
more if the data is being compared to earlier documented strong integration in 
times without similar market turbulence. The conclusion is also in line with the 
previous literature (e.g. Barrios et al. 2009). Whether the reason for wider yield 
spreads is entirely because of the crisis time cannot be conducted here. 
Although the trends in all credit quality factors during 2007−2010 support the 
expectations about the relations between the yield spreads and factors. 
 
The debt-to-GDP ratios were somewhat steadily increasing during the whole 
observation period supporting the parallel trend in yield spreads. More obvious 
however were the two peaks in indebtedness based on the public deficit figure. 
These peaks happened the exact same time as the differentiations in yield 
spreads, in beginning of 2009 and 2010, thus the differentiation concerned most 
notably the PIIGS countries and Belgium. The correlation between the 
international risk factor and the PIIGS countries was notable. Figure 11. fully 
captures the idea of negative relation while also strongly supporting the flight-
to-safety phenomenon. In terms of liquidity Greece and Italy lost clearly when 
compared the trading volumes of 2010 to the starting levels in 2007. 
Additionally Austria, Portugal and Spain lost more liquidity than Germany 
during the period. In 2010 only Austria, Greece, Portugal and the Netherlands 
had decreased liquidity which does not fully support the expectation about the 
liquidity factor if concentrated on the yield spreads only in 2010. The volatility 
in liquidity increased the most for Finland and Greece, while increasing also 
with Austria, Belgium and Portugal. Ireland, Finland and Austria had the 
poorest liquidity respectively. 
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As the conclusion from the descriptive analysis it is clear the financial crisis 
time increases the EMU government bond yields in general. However while 
concentrating on the 2010 crisis in Europe the following hypothesis cannot be 
fully approved: 
 
H1: The 2010 started financial crisis in Europe has strongly increased the 
spreads of EMU government bond yields 
 
The yield spreads have increased with all the selected countries during the 2010 
but strongly only with Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. With 
all of these countries the observed spreads were higher than in previous crisis 
suggesting highest ever spreads since the strong integration after the 
introduction of the euro. It is logical as the earlier studies (Pagano & von 
Thadden 2004, Barrios et al. 2009) have concluded that EMU bonds are 
substitutes (yet not perfect), and since  the country-specific features become 
important during the times of market stress, the crisis leads to discrimination 
between EMU bonds. Consequently the first hypothesis can only be accepted 
behalf of Belgium and the PIIGS countries.  
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5. EVIDENCE AT THE COUNTRY-LEVEL 
 
In this section is developed an econometric approach, a model, to determine the 
risk premium. The model aims to separation of systematic risk, country-specific 
credit risk and liquidity risk. First is shortly explained the data used here and 
then the methodology. This is followed by the presentation of the model and 
afterwards the empirical results of country-level analyses.  
 
 
5.1. Data 
 
The same data as in previous section is used but here with one notable 
challenge. The static feature of debt-related economic indicators lays a 
restrictive factor in the form of data mismatch. Where yields, liquidity and 
systematic risk variables can be observed at high-frequency the debt-to-GDP 
ratios and public deficit figures designating the country-specific credit risk are 
only available at quarter level. This makes a basic regression analysis with the 
raw data difficult but has also been a general challenge in previous studies (see 
e.g. Codogno et al. 2003, Barrios et al. 2009). This challenge is first dealt with by 
focusing on the variables at the quarter level and using arithmetic means for the 
high-frequency variables. 
 
As a proxy for systematic risk the relative change in the yield of U.S. T-note is 
used. The empirical literature on government bond spread research shows that 
the yields of the US government bonds are one of the main determinants of 
sovereign spreads. Also in previous studies yields on US bonds have been used 
as an indicator for international risk when modeling yields on euro zone 
government securities (Codogno et al. 2003: 514). This was more closely 
discussed earlier in Ch. 4. 
 
To measure country-specific credit risk, the debt-to-GDP ratio and public deficit 
figure presented in previous section are used. As mentioned these variables 
cause the challenge of data mismatch but at least they are relevant and true 
indicators of solvency and gearing. In their places one could also use 
alternatives, as for example prices of credit default swaps (CDS), but these 
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derivatives signals also the speculative positions of market participants and 
thus may cause bias. 
 
When assessing liquidity risk market depth is observed. As in some previous 
studies (e.g. Ejsing & Sihvonen 2009, Sgherri & Zoli 2009) the market depth is 
measured by the trading volumes, which were also presented more closely in 
the previous section. From these two data sets the liquidity of benchmark bonds 
is chosen since it consists of more normally distributed observations. The 
market depth may not be as good indicator as market width, i.e. bid-ask 
spreads which has also been a popular indicator for liquidity. However the 
monthly trading volumes were the only data set available. 
 
 
5.2. Econometric methodology 
 
The process to build a valid regression model for the analysis is started from 
arranging the independent variables in order by their causal relationship with 
the dependent variable. The studied independent variables are the previously 
mentioned yield of U.S. T-note, public deficit, debt-to-GDP and liquidity. First 
approach used here is a simple linear regression and after as in the paper of 
Kim et al. (2006: 1523−1524), a test of the Granger causality. In simple 
regressions each variable of country i, is regressed alone against the spread 
between the yields of country i’s and Germany’s bonds. When the yield spread 
is denoted as YS, and the yield of a 10-yr government bond as r, the spread is 
defined as 
 
(6)  tGERtiti rrYS ,,,   
 
at the time t. 
 
Since the same time point variables do not have much of an explanatory power 
the lagged values of regressors, i.e. one-period-prior values (t-1), are used. 
Therefore the simple regression is written as 
 
(7)  ttiti xYS   1,,  
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where  is the constant,  is the coefficient of the independent variable 1tx , 
and t  is the error term. 
 
Granger (1969) causality test is a regression-type approach which figures out 
how much of the current y can be explained by past values of y and then to see 
whether adding lagged values of x improves the explanation. If x has some 
explanatory power in y, or the coefficients on the lagged x’s are statistically 
significant, the x is said to Granger-cause y. Granger causality does not imply 
that y is the result of x but rather if x possess information content concerning y 
and in case of many explaining variables what is the precedence between them. 
The theory relies on the use of all past information of variables that is believed 
to help predict the other and thus with l lags forms the following equation: 
 
(8)  tltltltltt xxyyy    ...... 11110  
 
for all possible pairs of (x, y) series in the observation group. However suitable 
number of lags here is considered to be only one since the regression analysis 
focuses on the effects of the latest information available from the studied 
variables. Therefore the used Granger approach can be written as 
 
(9)  ttititi xYSYS    1,11,10,  
 
Besides these two methods (eq. 7 and 9) help build the valid model by exposing 
the relevance of variables, the additional benefit from using the Granger 
approach is that it can also reveal indication from the possible later problem of 
multicollinearity. The causal relationships between the yield spreads and the 
lagged variables of; yield spread, change in the US yield, public deficit, debt-to-
GDP and liquidity are reported on the next page in Table 3. 
 
As is the case with usually less volatile interest rates, the previous time point’s 
effect is dominant and hence it is included in simple regressions yielding to 
high validation when measured by R2 statistic. From Table 7. can be seen that 
the R2 for one-period-prior spread is very high ranging from 0.603 to 0.880 when 
regressed alone. This is good base for the model since the dominance will likely 
reduce serial correlation in the residuals in later regressions. 
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Table 7. The causal relationships of variables with YSi. 
 
 
Among the studied variables, liquidity and debt-to-GDP factors show strongest 
evidence of causality having both eight statistically significant coefficients out 
of ten, in simple regressions. Debt-to-GDP yields for higher R2 statistics, 
especially under the PIGS countries, whereas liquidity has more Granger 
causes, two against one. However the change in the yield of U.S. T-notes has the 
most Granger causes, seven in ten cases. The results suggest the public deficit 
factor has the poorest causality although in case of Ireland its coefficient is 
strongly significant. Other interpretations arising particularly from the Granger 
approach were causalities between public deficit and other variables, and 
between liquidity and debt-to-GDP. These interpretations may be signs of 
multicollinearity which needs to be taken into account in actual regressions. 
 
5.2.1. The regression model 
 
The first multiple linear regressions with quarter data contain relatively short 
time series because the observation period starts from the beginning of the 2007. 
The static feature of debt-related variables in turn requires arithmetic means to 
be used for yield spreads, T-note yields and trading volumes since the sparsest 
frequencies of these data sets are by monthly. These monthly data sets are 
averages from daily observations in that particular month. Certainly the used 
averages in the model are calculated from the monthly observations of that 
particular quarter. 
 
The regressions are first run with all the four studied variables in a similar way 
as in the paper of Barrios et al. (2009). Estimations are conducted with level-log 
AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA POR SPA NL
*** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
(0.647) (0.649) (0.603) (0.706) (0.880) (0.804) (0.776) (0.880) (0.859) (0.636)
- / ** * / ** - / * - / ** - / - - / *** - / * - / - - / - - / *
(0.089) (0.224) (0.079) (0.103) (0.131) (0.142) (0.153) (0.162) (0.155) (0.052)
- / - - / - - / - - / - - / - *** / - - / - * / - - / - - / -
(0.024) (0.019) (0.079) (0.140) (0.018) (0.566) (0.080) (0.241) (0.159) (0.000)
- / * * / - - / - * / - *** / - *** / - ** / - *** / - *** / - * / -
(0.004) (0.195) (0.035) (0.262) (0.757) (0.795) (0.365) (0.744) (0.664) (0.206)
*** / * ** / - *** / ** - / - * / - * / - *** / - ** / - - / - * / -
(0.541) (0.390) (0.511) (0.134) (0.261) (0.238) (0.510) (0.375) (0.148) (0.228)
ys(t-1)
us(t-1)
pd(t-1)
dtG(t-1)
liq(t-1)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: The R2 statistics of single regressions in parentheses
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regressions using ordinary least squares method (OLS) separately for each 
country.  The model is written as 
 
(10)  titititittiti LIQdtGPDUSYSYS ,1,51,41,3121,1,     
 
where YSi is the 10-year government bond spread versus Germany, US is the 
logged percentage change in the yield of the U.S. T-note and PDi is the public 
deficit figure, dtGi is the debt-to-GDP ratio and LIQi is the trading volume of 
country i. All the independent variables are lagged one time point designating 
the previous quarter. Thus the data matches such a way that the model should 
be able to estimate the next quarter’s average yield spread from the static values 
of the independent variables in this quarter. 
 
Since the first results seem to suffer from some characteristic problems of 
regression analysis, such as a high-degree of multicollinearity, the tests are run 
second time. The possible problem with the multicollinearity is concerned in 
terms of goodness-of-fit since the adjusted R2 statistics are relatively high (the 
lowest figure is 0.7218) but only 17 from the 40 independent variables are 
statistically significant with 10 % significance. As the solution for this problem 
the public deficit factor is dropped off. This is easily arguable since the 
coefficient of that variable was statistically significant in only one regression 
from ten. In addition the earlier used Granger test showed no evidence of 
causality with the yield spreads (see Table 3.) but instead with other variables it 
did. Consequently the improved model is expressed as 
 
(11)  tititittiti LIQdtGUSYSYS ,1,41,3121,1,     
 
After the second regressions with quarter data, the results look much better. 
With five countries the adjusted R2 statistic improved further and with three it 
remained almost the same. This is in line with the empirical literature since in 
similar studies (e.g. Fisher 1959, Lemmen & Goodhart 1999, Barrios et al. 2009) 
the goodness-of-fit has achieved relatively high levels, for example levels 
around 0.7. The number of statistically significant coefficients rose to 23 from 30 
(and all in all to 38 when accounted with constants and lagged yield spreads). 
In addition when replacing the debt-to-GDP factor with the public deficit factor 
in the estimation, the sums of squared residuals (SSR) were higher and R2 
statistics lower. For possible remained multicollinearity supporting regressions 
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are ran with the debt-to-GDP and liquidity factors which show no cases of a 
larger R2 statistic than in the actual regressions. 
 
However while the multicollinearity looks lowered to an approvable level, also 
the other characteristic problems (heteroskedasticity and serial correlation) of 
regression analysis needs to be taken into account. This is essential when 
pursuing optimal estimates for the coefficients of independent variables. In 
theory the estimates are optimal and called the best linear unbiased estimators 
(BLUE) if under the classical assumptions (see Figure 13.) the OLS method 
minimizes the SSR. This is called the Gauss-Markov theorem. Here the sums of 
squared residuals and variances of regressions are the least in most of the cases 
when compared to running the regressions with alternative data sets. 
(Davidson & MacKinnon 1999: 107.) 
 
 
1. Minimum SSR: E[ui] = 0, for all i (zero average error). 
2. Homoscedasticity: Var[ui] = σ
2
, for all i. 
3. No serial correlation: Cov[ui, uj] = 0, for all i ≠ j. 
4. Positive variance: Σni=1(xi-x)
2
 > 0. 
5. No multicollinearity: Cov[xi, zj] = 0, for all i ≠ j. 
Figure 13. The classical assumptions of OLS method and qualifications for BLUE (Davidson & 
MacKinnon 1999:88). 
 
 
To ensure valid results the regressions are ran by using Newey-West method 
(1987) which disposes the effects of both heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation of unknown form. The results with quarter data are presented on 
the next page in Table 8. 
 
Because of the short observation period there is a possibility of somewhat 
biased results from the regressions with quarter data. To improve the accuracy 
and reduce the observed characteristic problems a second set of regressions are 
ran but with monthly data. Since now there exists a restrictive factor caused by 
the low frequency variables, a method of simple interpolation is used. 
Importantly an attempt is made towards keeping consistency between the two 
specifications. The results with monthly data are presented in chapter 5.4. after 
the following quarter results. 
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5.3. Econometric evidence at the country-level from quarter data 
 
The model with quarter data resulted in relatively strong evidence which is 
reported below in Table 8.  
 
 
T able 8. Summary of country-level results from the regressions with quarter data. 
 
 
The adjusted R2 which ranges from 0.752 to 0.922 is used to measure the 
model’s goodness of fit since it penalizes for the addition of debilitating 
explanatory variables into the regression. The level of goodness of fit was 
expected to be high in the light of the previous studies but yet the overall level 
is surprisingly high. This can be expected to be because of the dominant effect 
of the previous time point yield spread. The standard errors of the regressions 
divide the countries clearly into two separate groups, the PIIGS and the rest. 
For the PIIGS the standard errors are quite high ranging from 0.2 % up to 0.4 %, 
except for Greece whose standard error of estimation is almost 1 %. Among the 
rest of the countries standard errors are tolerable and at highest 0.1 %. 
 
The signs of the coefficients are mainly as expected in the quarter evidence. The 
change in the yield of US T-notes has negative correlation with all of the yield 
spreads and thus proves the flight-to-safety phenomenon. Another point 
supporting the phenomenon is the multiple counter effect of US T-note yield’s 
change on the yields of countries with the deepest crisis, namely Portugal, 
Ireland and Greece. The coefficients of this international risk factor are all 
statistically significant and its impact is notable among the factors. For France 
AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA POR SPA NL
147.34** -32.70 72.27*** 3.84 -1076.94* -56.30*** -81.66 -331.68* -77.88 79.06*
(62.493) (36.522) (17.280) (18.560) (552.668) (15.389) (141.724) (171.109) (50.663) (36.085)
0.67*** 0.16 0.56*** 0.67*** 0.61** 0.71*** 0.58** 0.70*** 0.67*** 0.93***
(0.055) (0.204) (0.074) (0.119) (0.241) (0.149) (0.204) (0.173) (0.204) (0.156)
-0.59** -1.43*** -0.44** -0.41*** -4.23* -3.48*** -0.95** -1.92** -1.17** -0.52**
(0.230) (0.223) (0.167) (0.127) (2.080) (0.751) (0.394) (0.829) (0.487) (0.220)
-1.73* 1.32** -1.11** 0.21 10.18* 2.59*** 1.20 5.12* 2.57* -1.14*
(0.879) (0.535) (0.436) (0.277) (5.126) (0.702) (1.315) (2.405) (1.309) (0.594)
-0.23** -0.23*** -0.37*** -0.02 0.00 -0.36 -0.02* -0.10 -0.03 -0.09**
(0.074) (0.062) (0.094) (0.010) (0.052) (0.548) (0.010) (0.186) (0.033) (0.038)
adj. R² 0.857 0.863 0.832 0.765 0.890 0.922 0.802 0.903 0.889 0.752
SE 10.21 10.73 8.21 7.11 92.17 39.25 20.41 35.08 20.65 8.57
Prob. (F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
α
ys(t-1)
us(t-1)
dtG(t-1)
liq(t-1)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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the international risk has lowest effect when a change of -25 % in US T-Note 
yield (e.g. the interest rate decreases from 4 % to 3% in a quartal) means 0.1 % 
effect to the yield spread. Yet with the PIIGS countries and Belgium such a 
change has an effect ranging from 0.2 % to even 1.1 % and this kind of volatility 
has not been rare especially after the second quarter in 2007. 
 
All the coefficients of the liquidity factor have also negative correlation with the 
yield spread. Though with Greece the coefficient is zero but also not statistically 
significant. All in all liquidity is statistically significant with half of the countries 
and it seems the more significant role it plays the more it affects. Consequently 
its role is largest with Finland and Belgium, 10 million added trades decreases 
the yield spread by 3.7 basis points and 2.3 basis points respectively. Thus for 
Finland the liquidity effect is relatively negligible as well for Belgium but with 
Belgium’s most demanded bonds which are traded 300 – 500 million times in 
the data the effect may be as large as 0.7 – 1.1 %. The standard errors of 
liquidity factors were smallest within all the variables so the estimates remain 
quite constant through the observation period. 
 
Unexpected signs appeared only with the solvency factor. With Austria, 
Finland and the Netherlands debt-to-GDP ratio looks to correlate negatively, 
meaning that with additional debt the country’s yield spread with Germany 
narrows. Since the development of Germany’s debt ratio does not differ 
substantially from correspondents of these countries is this an interesting 
finding. The explanation may be some kind of a risk downgrade internally in 
EMU or then it might be hidden in the national aspects of these countries and 
cannot be explained in this thesis. However the counter effect for these 
countries remains small since even 10 % addition in debt ratio leads only to a 
decrease smaller than 0.2 % in the spread. With the crisis countries, namely 
Greece and Portugal the solvency is more important factor. For both of these 
countries the coefficient is also statistically significant and the mentioned 
change in the debt ratio means approx. 0.5 – 1.0 % larger spread. All in all the 
solvency factor was not statistically significant with France and Italy but with 
all the other countries. 
 
The results show strong evidence that these variables holds information content 
regarding the yield spread. Even after all the adjustments the model retained its 
explaining power which was as earlier mentioned largely because of the 
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previous time point yield spread.  This additional factor was strongly 
significant with all the other countries except with Belgium. Another interesting 
founding which suggests that regardless of the less volatile nature of interest 
rates the previous time period spread between the relatively stable interest rates 
of Belgium and Germany does not affect the next period’s spread and thus can 
be taken that in case of Belgium the country is more sensitive for the variables 
determining the risk premium. 
 
With the strong evidence from the quarter data the following null hypotheses: 
 
 H0: Solvency has zero coefficient while explaining EMU governments’ yield 
spreads with liquidity and international risk 
 H0: Liquidity has zero coefficient while explaining EMU governments’ yield 
spreads with solvency and international risk 
 H0: International risk has zero coefficient while explaining EMU 
governments’ yield spreads with solvency and liquidity 
 H0: The regression model formed from these three factors does not explain 
any variation of the EMU governments’ yield spreads (adj. R2 = 0.00) 
 
are all rejected since there was no single country that would not have any 
statistically significant coefficients among the tested credit quality factors. 
Therefore together with the perceived high levels of goodness of fit the quarter 
results support the second hypothesis: 
  
H2: Changes in the credit quality factors explain the observed changes in EMU 
government bond yield spreads during 2007−2010 
 
 
5.4. Econometric evidence at the country-level from monthly data 
 
Generally the evidence from monthly data is not as strong as it was from 
quarter data even though the consistency was kept between these two 
approaches. Whereas in quarter data 23 coefficients from total 30 of the three 
credit quality factors were statistically significant, in regressions with monthly 
data only 3 out of 30 are statistically significant with at least 5 % significance 
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level when tested with two-way t-statistic. The summary of the results is shown 
below in Table 9. 
 
 
T able 9. Summary of country-level results from the regressions with monthly data. 
 
 
The overall results from the regressions look to suffer again from the typical 
problem of multicollinearity. This might derive from grown importance of the 
previous time point yield spread. With denser data set or longer time period of 
observations the significance of the one-period-prior yield spread may seize 
significance from the other explaining factors especially while it is arguable that 
with more observations the clearer should be seen its parallel correlation with 
the other factors. Hence despite the high levels of goodness of fit ranging from 
0.849 to 0.958 only three statistically significant factors are found. However the 
margins of standard errors are smaller with all the countries than in the quarter 
data results. 
 
Surprisingly all the three statistically significant coefficients represent each a 
different factor. Two of these coefficients, the solvency and liquidity factors, are 
significant with Austria and the third the international risk factor is significant 
with Portugal. From these the coefficient of debt-to-GDP is the only one to have 
unexpected sign meaning negative correlation with the yield spread. Anyhow 
the effect is smaller than in the quarter results, -0.70 vs. -1.73, thus this 
unexplained notice is not as heavy as it was with the looser data. Eventhough 
the liquidity factor has the right sign this time its role is even more negligible 
than in quarter observations.  The change in the US’s yield has also the right 
AUS BEL FIN FRA GRE IRE ITA POR SPA NL
57.44** 17.86 17.63** -0.71 -228.84 -10.98 0.23 -98.37 -24.04 11.84
(26.072) (32.595) (6.755) (11.148) (171.099) (17.946) (58.917) (75.776) (22.831) (9.737)
0.89*** 0.93*** 0.90*** 0.88*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.95*** 0.90*** 0.98*** 0.98***
(0.068) (0.112) (0.063) (0.100) (0.094) (0.092) (0.076) (0.085) (0.102) (0.082)
-0.02 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 -0.39 -0.08 -0.28 -0.41* -0.12 -0.18
(0.152) (0.126) (0.083) (0.070) (0.663) (0.524) (0.181) (0.240) (0.284) (0.112)
-0.70* -0.06 -0.30 0.10 2.24 0.80 0.09 1.62 0.66 -0.18
(0.382) (0.424) (0.183) (0.194) (1.666) (0.553) (0.580) (1.111) (0.628) (0.176)
-0.07** -0.03 -0.06 -0.00 -0.01 -0.25 -0.00 -0.08 0.00 -0.01
(0.032) (0.030) (0.037) (0.006) (0.012) (0.310) (0.002) (0.060) (0.013) (0.009)
adj. R² 0.890 0.885 0.910 0.849 0.958 0.942 0.932 0.939 0.925 0.899
SE 9.24 10.19 6.08 6.01 55.42 33.61 12.22 27.59 17.13 5.60
Prob. (F) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
α
ys(t-1)
us(t-1)
dtG(t-1)
liq(t-1)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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sign and its effect is again largest among the explanatory variables though its 
role is now approximately ten times smaller than it was with quarter data.  
 
All the standard errors are now smaller than they were in quarter regressions 
and roughly half of that in case of coefficients. However one problematic 
consequence arises from the used factors. As already mentioned the previous 
time point yield spread has now grown even more important while also having 
very strong significance for all of its coefficients. These ranges from 0.88 with 
France to 0.98 with the Netherlands leaving on average only 5–15 %‘s part from 
the spread explaining for other sudden factors. This part is calculated as the 
average relative difference between the yield spread and only the previous time 
point yield spread’s explaining part (note: Austria and Finland are left out because 
they have also significant constant which together with the YS t-1 factor explains on 
average more than 100 % of the perceived yield spreads since all the other explaining 
factors together are expected to affect negatively to the yield spread). The part of other 
factors is called sudden because one can expect that at any rate the static 
variables of studied risk premium factors are at least partially considered 
already in form of YSt-1 when explaining the YSt (and thus may have also 
caused some degree of multicollinearity). Therefore the left outs of the studied 
variables does not have changes radical enough in denser data to emerge as 
statistically significant. This problem suggests that either must be paid attention 
towards the possibilities of a biased model despite the high adjusted R2 or the 
markets’ inefficient functioning since the highest unexplained parts of the 
model are with Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Belgium. And especially with 
these countries should be reasonable to expect the studied risk premium factors 
to have statistical significance in the light of recent information and based on 
literature and the results from the previous section. 
 
Although also a third possible interpretation of the problematic results might 
remain which is sudden changes in market conditions caused by some external 
intervention or another unexpected single event. For example the activities of 
the ECB or EMU governments to stable market conditions may be these kinds 
of random effects. If this is the case it is completely impossible to build a model 
to estimate the risk premiums or interest rates of EMU members and it is 
unfortunate also in terms that this kind of a random event or intervention was 
not even possibility in the first place according to the article 125 in the Lisbon 
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treaty, the amendment of the principle treaty of the EU, the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union. 
 
Regardless of the proposed interpretations the same null hypotheses as 
presented with quarter data are still rejected based on the evidence from 
monthly data. Only this time the evidence is very weak since the results show 
statistical significance for each risk premium factor only once and with Austria 
and Finland. Thus the second hypothesis: 
  
H2: Changes in the credit quality factors explain the observed changes in EMU 
government bond yield spreads during 2007−2010 
 
may be partially accepted because no evidence from significance was found 
with all the countries. 
 
When comparing the evidences between the two regressions it is obvious the 
data frequency has notable significance. This is in line with the previous 
literature as for example in the study of Barrios et al. (2009) quarterly data 
produced much more statistically significant results than weekly data. In this 
thesis the difference is even more distinct as mentioned already that based on 
the monthly data only one coefficient per factor was found statistically 
significant. Although this may be because of the data mismatch or the 
constitution of used factors there is no other option than rejection of the 
following third hypothesis: 
 
H3: The market pricing of EMU government bonds is consistent regardless of 
the explaining factors’ information frequency 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Based on the descriptive analysis it is clear the EMU government bond yield 
spreads contained an upward rising trend during the years 2007−2010. 
Especially during the crisis years 2009 and 2010 the spreads increased notably. 
These observations support findings from earlier studies though in the latter 
crisis the differentiation of yield spreads concerned only Belgium and the PIIGS 
countries. The findings suggest that investors started to concern EMU 
government bonds more as substitutes after the global financial crisis in 2009. 
This discrimination between countries partially derives from the country-
specific features but especially from solvency since it is the most important 
country-level factor and correlated negatively with Austria, Finland and the 
Netherlands, the less indebted countries. As argued by Barrios et al. (2009) the 
country-specific features grow importance during market turbulence thus 
supporting the observed discrimination effect. 
 
The international risk also played major role affecting most negatively again to 
Belgium and the PIIGS countries. This is logical since the factor was measured 
with the change in yields of US T-note, considered as the safest investment on 
the financial markets. In addition liquidity premia was found in regressions 
with quarter data having a straightforward relation to yields, the better the 
liquidity the lower the interest rate and hence the spread. Its significance 
however was minor and highlighted only in cases of countries with poor 
liquidity, such as Austria, Belgium and Finland.      
 
To specify empirically the determinants of government bond yield spreads is a 
challenging task. And this task is not eased by the fact that probably the best 
determinants of financial stance, such as the solvency factors, are relatively 
static. Nevertheless the results of this thesis have important implications. 
Although statistically significant and strong evidence was found while using 
quarterly data this was completely opposite while using denser data. Similar 
results have been reported in previous studies (e.g. Barrios et al. 2009) thus 
suggesting the market does not value EMU government bonds correctly in 
short-term. The lack of evidence may be for various reasons but the possible 
market mispricing raises concerns and should draw attention further ahead. 
Though if the market structures are unexpectedly changed as recently in EMU, 
the task may become even more challenging. 
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